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Re´sume´
A partir du proble`me du bar d’El Farol, nous construisons le jeu de la mi-
norite´, un mode`le extreˆmement simple de compe´tition entre des agents adap-
tatifs, et e´tudions ses proprie´te´s. Il en ressort que ce mode`le pre´sente une
transition de phase avec brisure de syme´trie. Un formalisme ade´quat est in-
troduit, qui montre le lien entre le jeu de la minorite´ et les verres de spin. Il
permet de montrer que ce type de mode`les posse`de ge´ne´ralement une fonction
de Lyapunov, l’information disponible. Des me´thodes mathe´matiques de la
physique statistique des syste`mes de´sordonne´s sont applique´es pour trouver
la solution exacte du jeu de la minorite´. De plus, l’impact que les joueurs ont
sur le jeu se re´ve`le d’une importance fondamentale : si ceux-ci en tiennent
compte, ils sont capables de minimiser leurs pertes.
Diverses extensions et modifications de ce mode`le sont conside´re´es. Par
exemple, la pre´sence d’un processus e´volutif de type darwiniste est globa-
blement be´ne´fique pour le syste`me, qui reproduit la loi de dure´e de vie des
espe`ces biologiques.
Un lien formel est e´tabli entre le jeu de la minorite´ et les marche´s fi-
nanciers, ce qui permet d’e´tudier le roˆle des diffe´rents types d’acteurs dans
ces marche´s. Par exemple, nous montrons que les spe´culateurs ne sont pas des
parasites, mais au contraire qu’ils permettent a` ceux qui utilisent la bourse
dans un autre but que la pure spe´culation d’obtenir un prix plus juste, dont
ils re´duisent les fluctuations.
Enfin, le jeu de la minorite´ est modifie´ pour mode´liser de fac¸on plus
re´aliste les marche´s financiers : le prix ainsi obtenu a des proprie´te´s statis-
tiques non triviales.
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Abstract
Starting from the El Farol’s bar problem, we introduce the minority game, an
extremely simple model of competition between adaptive agents. We study
its properties, and find that it displays a phase transition with symmetry
breaking. An adequate mathematical formalism is introduced and reveals
the spin glass nature of the model. We prove that available information is
a Lyapunov function for this model. Using mathematical tools of disordered
systems’ statistical sechanics, we obtain the exact solution of the minority
game. In addition, the market impact is shown to be crucially relevant : if
the players account for it, they are able to minimize their losses.
Several extensions and modifications of the game are studied. In partic-
ular, the system globally benefits from the presence of a Darwinist process,
and reproduces the biological species life time distribution.
The minority game is formally linked to the financial markets. This allows
the study of the role of several kinds of agents. For instance, we show that
speculators are not parasites, but play an important role in financial markets :
they reduce the price’s fluctuations and allow people who use the markets
for other reasons than pure speculation to obtain fair prices.
Finally, the minority game is extended further in order to model more
realistically markets dynamics. A price is obtained, which has non-trivial
statistical properties.
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Introduction
The perception of the very structure of nature changed tremendously at the
beginning of the twentieth century. General Relativity revised the concepts
of space and time, and Quantum Mechanics those of the structure of mat-
ter. Both theories concern domains outside daily experience. They are so
fascinating and so rich that the major trend in physics has been to explore
as much as possible their implications.
Although fundamental Physics is nothing less than fundamental, it is
not the whole subject. There was a niche for a new trend in Physics,
Econophysics, which is still very vaguely defined, but whose aim is to promote
new1 fields of research such as economy or financial markets, and rediscov-
ering daily life, which, far from becoming a monotone and sterile land for
physicists, remains for them an inexhaustible source of questions and inspi-
ration.
Econophysicists expect that the application to other fields of concepts and
statistical methods borrowed from physics will yield fruitful results2. In the
case of financial markets, one can consider the price as a fluctuating macro-
scopic quantity resulting from interactions between agents, seen as particles.
This is of course an imperfect analogy, for instance because agents’ behavior
is probably not as simple as that of electrons. But statistical physics shows
that the properties of macroscopic quantities do not crucially depend on all
the details of the interaction between simple elements. Some physicists’ Holy
Grail is to directly apply those methods to economy and financial markets
[1]. Unfortunately (?) human behavior is more subtle than that of elec-
trons : whereas the latter have permanent properties, like mass, charge and
spin, which can be erected as truths, there is nothing like that regarding
human behavior, except the fact that there is nothing like that. Apart from
being a joke, this assertion aims to show that the permanent properties of
human behavior are probably not quite similar to those physicists are used
1for physicists, of course.
2A good example of Physicists’ concepts (diffusion) and methods applied to market
prices can be found in [2].
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to.
There are two main fields of study of financial markets. The first one
consists in characterizing the statistical properties of prices (see for instance
[2]) —this is now possible due to the large amount of available digital data.
On the other hand, physicists as well as economists are looking for models
reproducing the properties of prices [3, 4]. More precisely, they try to deter-
mine which are the essential ingredients to obtain those properties. There
are two main approaches. One is to describe the price with a stochastic dif-
ferential equation [4]. The other possibility is agent based financial markets
[3], where the behavior of agents is modeled, and a price defined. Economists
usually study very refined models [3], which are often too refined to be easily
understood, whereas physicists most of the time propose models being too
simple to be deeply relevant for financial markets.
The minority game [5] is a compromise between the too complicated mod-
els of economists and the too simple models of physicists, probably because it
is physicists’ simplification of an economist’s model. It shows, maybe in the
simplest way, the interplay between the behavior of agents and the macro-
scopic properties they create. Thanks to its extreme simplicity, it is mostly
exactly solvable by tools of statistical physics. Therefore, it is hopefully a
good example of how physicists can contribute to the understanding of finan-
cial markets. In addition, the minority game is also relevant in areas such as
biology and sociology.
Chapter 1
Financial markets
1.1 How do financial markets work
A market place is basically designed for exchanging goods at fair prices — in
financial markets, goods are for instance shares of an asset. One condition
to obtain fair prices is that several people are wishing to sell a given good
at the same time that several other people are willing to buy the same good,
so that a kind of dynamical auction process can take place : prospective
sellers publish at what price there are willing to sell which quantity of goods,
and potential buyers publish their wishes (volume, price), giving rise to a
whole distribution of asked prices and bid prices (see Fig. 1.1). Actually,
agents (sellers or buyers) place bid or ask orders on a book, called order book.
Agents are free to change their orders at any time.
Whenever some sellers and some buyers agree on a price, a given quantity
of shares — called volume — is exchanged at that price. Most of the time
however, no transaction takes place, because the highest price a potential
buyer is willing to pay is lower than the lowest price at which a seller would
accept to exchange his good. The difference between these two prices is called
the spread.
In most markets, there are persons who have a special function : the mar-
ket makers. In some markets such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)1,
there is one market maker per stock, so that all orders are centralized. In oth-
ers markets such as the NASDAQ2, called over the counter market (OTC),
there is a variable number of market makers per stock. Market makers are in
some sense the oil of the markets : they smooth the dynamics of the market
by their actions. For instance, when there are few people interested in trad-
1www.nyse.com
2www.nasdaq.com
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Figure 1.1: Order book of the stock price of Sun Microsystems on Island
ECN (Januar, 24th 2000, at 09:47:57). The bid orders are plotted in gray
and the ask orders in black. The last price paid is 85 5/8 $ (dashed line).
ing a given stock, wihtout market makers, the spread would often be very
large, and the price would vary with jumps : this is a bad situation, where
one may not obtain a fair price. In such situations, a market maker will re-
duce the spread by placing his own orders on the order book. By doing this,
he takes risks ; however, market makers are allowed to maintain a spread
even in much less risky situations. In this case, the spread is the price people
willing to trade pay for the services market makers offer.
As everybody knows, profit making is possible by buying a good at a low
price and selling it at a higher prices ; this is called taking a long position and
closing it. A less known possibility to make profit is to sell a good without
possessing it at a high price and to buy it afterwards at a lower price (short
selling) ; this is called a short position. Since markets prices grow on average,
some traders are reluctant to take short positions.
Consequently, there are two opposite motivations for buying an asset, and
two opposite motivations for selling it.
1.2 Predictability
A major issue concerning financial markets is their predictability. Indeed,
if financial markets are predictable, how can they remain predictable, since
so many smart people try to make money by forecasting future price moves.
Reversely, if financial markets are not predictable, how can so many people
make money ?
The story began with Bachelier back in the 1900’s : for him, stock prices
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follow a random walk, thus financial markets are zero sum games, that is,
the gain of a speculator is zero on average [6]. Later, this theory has been
developed and is known as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) [7] : a
market is efficient if there are no arbitrages, i.e. possibilities of predictable
gains. A market is efficient if three conditions are met :
1. All agents are rational and maximize their gain. They also know that
all other agents are rational and gain maximizers.
2. Information is easily and immediately available.
3. There are no transaction costs.
The first assumption is very common in Economics. If it is true, all the
sophisticated tools and concepts of Game Theory can be applied. However,
it is more and more debated (see below) [13, 14]. In the second assumption,
the term “information” is not precisely defined : there are many kinds of
information, so that EMH is often found under three forms :
Weak All the public information on past prices and volumes is reflected on
the current price at every time.
Intermediate All public information of any kind (earnings, political news, . . . ) is
included in the price at every time.
Strong All kinds of information, including secret information are fully reflected
on the price at every time.
Empirical evidences show that the strong form is too strong and incor-
rect [8] ; it is also not very well defined. The intermediate form is under
discussion amongst economists and practitioners, whereas the weak form is
often believed to be true by many economists. However, there are many
facts that contradict even the weakest form of EMH. The best-known and
persistent one is the January effect : during this month, stocks generate ab-
normally high returns. In addition, empirical studies [9, 12] show that there
are systematic correlations in most financial markets3. Economists call such
facts small anomalies without significance. But these anomalies are quite
frequent4 (see [8]).
It is worth reviewing some methods used by practitioners, and which form
of EMH they rely on. The Portfolio Theory optimizes the composition of a
3However, transaction costs may be an obstacle to exploit them.
4We let the reader to judge if they are significant.
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portfolio ; its standard form is based on the assumption that the market are
efficient5. On the other hand, Technical Analysis studies time series of old
prices in order to find patterns like trends, cycles, and other regularities, and
predicts future prices. This yields gains if the weak form of EMH is not ver-
ified. Furthermore, Fundamentals Analysis tries to find differences between
the actual value of an asset and its “intrinsic” value . This implies the break
of the intermediate form. All these techniques are used by practitioners, but
they are recommended in three different market regimes, thus it does not
make sense to use them simultaneously. However, they coexist and are all
used. This shows at best that the efficiency issue is not simple and that no-
body has a definitive answer. Even worse, nobody agrees on how to measure
efficiency.
1.3 Fluctuations
Another very important quantity in financial markets is prices’ fluctuations.
It is known that the fluctuations are clustered in time, that is, if a stock price
has large fluctuations at a given time, it is very probable that these large
fluctuations will last a while, and then decrease. Fluctuations are synonyms
of risk for investors, since they are related to the uncertainty of a price.
1.4 Rationality–Bounded Rationality–Induction
The most important hypothesis of EMH is that all agents are rational gain
maximizers. This supposes that they have access to all the information they
need in order to deduce what is the best decision to take, and is mostly
unrealistic.
First, the instantaneous access to all valuable information may not be not
achieved in most cases, even with the help of computers, so that one often
has to deal with uncertain or incomplete information.
Nevertheless, suppose that information is not an issue. The major prob-
lem is the assumption of rationality and deduction. In practice, humans can-
not cope with too much information (complete or not) : there have bounded
rationality [13, 14]. Information processing capabilities supposed by a ratio-
nal behavior are often well beyond human limits [14]. Therefore, humans do
not look for optimal choices, but satisfactory choices [13]. Instead of being
deductive, humans are rather inductive, that is, they constantly build new
hypothesis, test them, discard those who turn out to be wrong, and trust
5Or marginally efficient [10, 11]
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those that appear to be correct [14]. For instance, pattern recognition is
an inductive task, while criminal investigations a` la Colombo is a deduc-
tive task. When a situation is either too complicated or requires a too fast
decision for their deduction capabilities, humans switch to induction.
Suppose nevertheless that ONE person only has a gift for deduction.
He cannot ever take a rational decision, because other people do not behave
rationally. Therefore, most problems in Economics are ill posed, and bounded
rationality, like induction, is more suited than rationality for solving them.
1.5 The El Farol’s Bar Problem
In order to illustrate ill posed problems in Economics, W. Brian Arthur
introduced his famous El Farol’s bar problem. Going to this bar is not
enjoyable if more than sixty people — the comfort level — are simultaneously
present. Suppose that there are more than sixty people wishing to go to the
bar, and that they do not know each other. Some relevant information about
the system is the past attendance, but it may be not enough to take a rational
decision ; in addition, since agents do not know each other, they cannot be
sure that other agents will be rational. Note that heterogeneity amongst
customers is mandatory : if all potential customers analyze the situation in
the same way, all will lose.
Induction can be used : customers have their own mental schemes, or
behavior rules (strategies), which they use as attendance predicting devices.
They keep track of the performance of the latter and use the one with the
highest score. If the device they use predicts an attendance lower than the
comfort level, they decide to go to the bar, and reversely. Surprisingly, this
model is able to reproduce an attendance fluctuating around sixty using
Arthur’s behavior rules6 [14], which is a kind of equilibrium.
This model raised a lot of interest in the Economics community. Many
authors tried to understand the model and published papers with evocative
titles such as “Clarifying the El Farol’s problem” [15] ; some authors claim
to have found rigorous results [16]. One reason of the encountered difficulties
is that people do not interact directly among themselves, but through a
common closed environment which they create themselves.
6For instance, the predicted next attendance is the same as last week’s, a mirror image
around 50 of last week’s, a constant one, a (rounded) average of the last four weeks, etc
. . .
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Chapter 2
The Minority Game
Several years after its introduction, the El Farol’s bar problem remained
mysterious. In particular, it had been realized that standard tools of Game
Theory were of little use for the strategies Arthur defined. Casti beg for a
better formulation and appropriate mathematical tools for what he called
the most important problem in complex systems theory [18]. What was miss-
ing was a good parameterization of the behavior rules. Indeed, there is no
systematic way of deriving rules given by Arthur (who gave them only as ex-
amples). Only recently (up to our knowledge) this was done by economists
[19], who curiously did not undertake a systematic study of Arthur’s model ;
they failed to reproduce Arthur’s results, and concluded that this model is
“suspect”. This does not reflect a better understanding of why Arthur’s
agents seems to reach an equilibrium.
2.1 From El Farol to MG
When simplifying the El Farol problem, one has to keep its two key features,
namely
• Frustration : not all persons can win at the same time, even if they are
willing to. This makes the model non trivial, and keeps the competition
going.
• Inductive agents : agents have strategies and strategies have scores
which evolve in time. This makes agents adaptive.
Hundred agents competing for sixty seats is a rather specific definition1.
A more general definition is N agents and L seats. If agents behave in such a
1Which, again, was only though as an example by Arthur.
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way that the attendance fluctuate around L, they reach a kind of equilibrium.
But the fluctuations around the comfort capacity are in themselves very
interesting : the larger they are, the less optimally agents behave. So the
average attendance determines the overall capacity of agents to learn a given
comfort level while the fluctuations around the comfort level measure the
strength of cooperation. Generally speaking, the fluctuations are a direct
consequence of competition.
Symmetry is a concept of particular importance for physicists. In the El
Farol’s bar problem, both decisions are not a priori equivalent, hence, the
problem is not symmetric. The idea is to first study and understand the
symmetric problem, and then to generalize this knowledge to asymmetric
situations. Building the symmetric El Farol’s problem is obtained by setting
a comfort capacity of L = N/2. Agents wins if their choice is that of minority.
2.2 No information — Nash equilibria
If a minority game is played once, the Game Theory allows the study of
the best choices to be taken for agents. When all agents behave in such a
way that if they deviate from their current behavior they win less, a Nash
equilibrium is attained [17]. For a minority game, the only rational behavior
consists of taking random decisions. Of course, this is not very satisfactory
and one has to give information to agents in order to obtain a non trivial
behavior.
2.3 Information
If the game is repeated, at least one agent may think that past attendance
is of valuable information, and that next attendance depend on previous
ones2. That is how people behave in the El Farol’s bar problem : Arthur’s
behavior rules predicts an attendance A(t + 1) ∈ N = {0, · · · , N} from the
knowledge of the attendance of past days {A(t), A(t − 1), · · ·} ∈ N t. These
are mathematical functions from an exponentially growing set into a constant
set ; with such a setup, there are NN
t
such functions. One can remove the
time dependence by supposing that agents do not remember or take into
account attendance older than M time steps (M stands for memory), so
that there remain NN
M
possible behavior rules. From agents’ point of view,
the only relevant prediction is whether the bar will be crowded or not, that is,
2If he acts thinking so, then next attendance will indeed depend on previous attendance,
just because he thinks so.
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there only are interested in a binary prediction. There are 2N
M
such behavior
rules, which is still a very large number.
The last step leading to the Minority Game is to simplifying the infor-
mation given to agents : indeed, it is responsible to the factor NM in the
number of behavior rules. The key observation is that it does no make much
sense to base binary decisions on highly detailed information. From now, the
common information given to all agents will be the M last correct decisions,
i.e. the last M decisions of the minority. There are consequently 2M possible
pieces of information, and 22
M
different behavior rules.
2.4 The Minority Game
In this section the Minority Game (MG) [20] is defined ab initio : at a given
time, some people have two choices, say, A or B ; they take their decisions
simultaneously, without any kind of communication between them ; those
who happen to be in minority win. This is exactly the inverse of a democratic
vote. Indeed, in a minority game, it is not the interest of any agent to behave
in the same way than the herd and there is no prior communication. The
minority mechanism is a way to implement competition for a scarce resource
(the maximum number of winners is limited). Agents are faced to two main
types of information :
• Public information : for instance, the “state of the world”. The
most basic global information about the system is which choices were
successful in the past. The precise attendance is also a valuable source
of information, although maybe too detailed.
• Private information : Adaptive agents are able to trace how well
they perform and to modify their behavior when needed.
Adaptive agents have global information processing devices3 that trans-
form the global information into a behavior. Mathematically speaking, such
a device is function a from the set of all possible global pieces information I
into the set of available choices C. Thus the choice of the kind of global infor-
mation is crucial for the model. For the sake of greatest simplicity possible,
the agents are given only the set of the right choices. It does not make sense
to give access at one time to all previous right choices, thus an arbitrary limit
is given : only the last M last winning choices are accessible. With this par-
ticular choice, the global information can be encoded by a string of M bits,
3In the following, we shall call it simply strategies.
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0 standing for “A was winning” and 1 for “B was the right choice” (or the
reverse), and there are P = 2M possible information ; furthermore, a strategy
is simply a lookup table with P rows (see table below for an example)
signal choice
000 1
001 0
010 0
011 1
100 1
101 0
110 1
111 0
Such a function can be thought as a “theory of the world” : to every
“state of the world” corresponds a fixed choice, i.e. an a priori belief. At this
point, there are several ways of implementing adaptation
• One variable strategy Each agent gets one randomly drawn strategy
at the beginning of the game and is able to modify it during the game.
• Several constant strategies Each agents gets a set of strategies, keep
track of their performance and use at each time step the one that seems
to be the most adequate.
The first possibility belongs to the class of genetic algorithms and may
appear the most natural, but it requires a priori P registers in order to
keep track of the performance of the strategy for each possible information,
while the second one only needs one register per strategy, therefore it is more
economical to give S strategies per agent.
Finally the way the agents perceive the success of their strategies is fixed
in the following way : after each time steps, agents add a point to the score
of each of her strategies that have predicted correctly what action to take,
and subtract one point to the others. This setup is maybe conceptually the
simplest payoff possible and entails that agents do not have any way to know
the precise outcome of the games.
2.5 Algorithm
The minority game is a closed dynamical system, hence, any formal descrip-
tion has to be self-consistent, looking maybe complicated.
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N agents play at each time step t a minority game (MG). They base their
decisions on the common pieces of information µ(t) ∈ P where P is the set
of all possible piece of information. In order to react to the latter, they have
S strategies (behavior rules) ai,s, i = 1, · · · , N , s = 1, · · · , S, which are a
function from the set P into the set of possible actions ; here, the possible
actions are −1 and +1, hence aµi,s = −1 or +1. Each strategy ai,s is given a
score Ui,s(t) which aims at reflecting their perceived success rate. At time t,
agent use the strategy si(t) according to
si(t) = arg max
s=1,···,S
Ui,s(t) (2.1)
that is, the one with the highest score, and they take the decision given by this
strategy, namely ai(t) = a
µ(t)
i,si(t)
. The decisions of all agents are aggregated
into the global quantity
A(t) =
∑
i
ai(t) (2.2)
The history µ(t) is updated into
µ(t + 1) = [2µ + (1 + sgnA(t))/2] MOD P (2.3)
and the reward
−ai(t)sgn[A(t)] = ±1 (2.4)
is given to agents i = 1, · · · , N . In turn, the latter update the score of their
strategies according to
Ui,s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t)− ai,ssgn[A(t)] (2.5)
Eqs (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (2.5) completely define the model, whose dynam-
ical quantities are si, Ui,s and µ. Note that Eq. (2.4) encode the minority
mechanism ; any odd4 function encodes the minority mechanism as well. In
the following, we shall generalize this equation to more general payoff func-
tion G(x), and shall focus on G(x) = x, for practical reasons.
2.6 Macroscopic properties
Since the MG has only three parameters N , M and S, it is very suitable for
systematic study and analysis. In principle, any macroscopic scalar quantity
only depends on these three parameters.
4In principle, any function G such that xG(x) > 0 would be acceptable ; here we
consider only odd functions for symmetry reasons.
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Figure 2.1: Normalized fluctuations versus the control parameter α = 2M/N
for S = 2 (circles), S = 3 (triangles), S = 4 (stars), S = 5 (x) and S = 6
(diamonds) (M=8, average over 50 samples). The straight line is ∝ 2M/N .
2.6.1 Cooperation
One striking property of this model is the fact that agents cooperate. A
relevant measure of cooperation is provided by the fluctuations of attendance
A(t)
σ2 = 〈A2〉 (2.6)
where the average is taken over the time. Agents taking random decisions
would produce fluctuations equal to N , so that agents cooperate if they
manage to produce fluctuations lower than N . Figure 2.1 shows normalized
fluctuations measured at fixed M and S versus α = 2M/N for various S
[21, 22]. For fixed S, one can distinguish grosso modo three regions :
• Small α : Agents display a herding behavior and produces non-
Gaussian fluctuations σ2 ∼ N2. This region has been called crowded
region since it is reach by keeping M constant and increasing N .
• Intermediate α : Best coordination is achieved.
• Large α : Coordination slowly disappears and the variance of the
outcome tends to the one that would be produced by agents taking
random decisions.
Savit et al. noted that if S = 2, σ2/N versus 2M/N collapse on the same
curve for any M and N [21]. This is true for any S at fixed S [22], and is a
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very interesting observation : it implies that 2M/N is the control parameter
of the MG.
When S is varied, the crowded region moves to the right, whereas σ2/N
for N  2M seems to collapse on roughly the same curve. The minimum of
σ2/N is less and less pronounced when S is larger, and its position is linearly
dependent on S. This suggest the existence of a control parameter that
makes fluctuations have their minimum at the same abscissa and collapse on
the same curve ∝ N/P for small α.
At first look, emergence of cooperation may be strange, since agents are
selfish and faced to a competitive situation. It took almost two years before
this could be explained [24]. But agents behave very badly for small 2M/N ,
and this indicates that cooperation does not arise in all circumstances.
2.6.2 Predictability – Phase transition
The next major important quantity is the predictability of the next minority
choice, particularly with respect to the controversy about financial markets
and EMH. In the MG, there are three kinds of information. The first one
is the histories, which are public common pieces of information encoding
the previous M last minority choices. Another kind of information agents
receive is the rewards. For them, it is the only way of learning something
about the game their are playing. When the game is repeated, agents ac-
cumulate information about the system, and encode them into the scores of
their strategies. The latter therefore contain valuable information about the
performance of each of their strategies and, in principle, about the system.
In principle means “if the next minority choice is predictable”.
Because of the symmetric design of the MG, 〈A〉 = 0, hence, on average,
at first sight the sign χ(t + 1) of the outcome A(t + 1) is not predictable.
But agents behave conditionaly : they know at each time step the history
of the game ; as a consequence, one has to consider the time average of
A(t + 1) conditional to µ(t) = ν. The next minority choice is predictable if
the conditional average 〈A|ν〉 6= 0. A measure of the predictability is
Θ = lim
T→∞
P∑
ν=1
ρν
[
1
T ν
T∑
t=1
χ(t)δν,µ(t)
]2
=
P∑
ν=1
ρν〈χ|ν〉2 = 〈χ〉2 (2.7)
where ρν = T ν/T = 1/T
∑T
t=1 δν,µ(t) is the frequency of history ν. Figure
2.2 shows that for small α, Θ = 0. At the point where the fluctuations are
minimal (αc ' 0.3), Θ begins to differ from zero and then monotonically
grows [21, 24]. Therefore, for α > αc, the outcome is predictable. This
predictability is related to asymmetries in the outcomes. In language of sta-
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Figure 2.2: Above : Normalized fluctuations versus α = 2M/N ; below :
order parameter Θ ; (M = 5 (circles), M = 6 (squares), M = 8 (diamonds)
(300 P iterations, average over 200 samples)
tistical mechanics, MG undergoes a phase transition with symmetry breaking
as α is varied, and Θ is an order parameter of the system. Indeed, for S = 2
and α < αc = 0.3374.., the outcome is symmetric and this phase is called
symmetric ; on the other hand, Θ 6= 0 for α > αc : this is the asymmetric
phase.
An asymmetry means that the outcome is probabilistically predictable,
thus one expects that adaptive agents could exploit the asymmetry, reduce
it and finally completely remove it, making the game efficient for agents, as
supposed by the EMH. This is achieved if there are enough agents (N >
Nc = P/αc). Indeed, even if the number of agents is fixed in the MG, the
presence of available information would attract more agents until information
disappears. Therefore, at the simple level of the MG, one apparently recovers
the weak form of EMH. However, the MG is never efficient, except at the
critical point (see next subsection).
2.6.3 Persistence – anti-persistence
The order parameter Θ introduced above is not sufficient to describe the
statistical properties of the canonical MG. Indeed, although it gives a good
overall description of the asymmetric phase, it tells nothing about the dy-
namics of the symmetric phase. Another kind of information is needed. The
right one is given by the correlation between the outcome at time t and that
at time t + δt conditional to the history [24]
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Figure 2.3: Temporal correlation of χt on the same history,
〈χtχt+τ |µt = µt+τ 〉, averaged over all histories versus τ (106 iterations,
M = 6, α = 0.5, 0.22, 0.1)
〈χ(t)χ(t + δt〉 =
P∑
ν=1
ρν〈χ(t)χ(t + δt)|µ(t) = µ(t + δt) = ν〉 (2.8)
As reported by Fig 2.3, the system behaves very differently between the
different phases. In the symmetric phase, the system behaves in a periodic
and anti-persistent way5. The period is 2P , meaning that agents tend to do
the opposite of what they did when the history was the same.
The asymmetric phase is characterized by persistence : agents tend to
repeat their last action. The critical point is the only point where the sys-
tem has no long time correlations, in other words the MG is arbitrage free
only at the critical point. Therefore, the game seems efficient to agents in
the symmetric phase, because they cannot detect anti-persistence with their
simple strategies, but actually is not efficient. A better equipped agent out-
smarts agents who cannot profit from anti-persistence (see chapter 5). These
finding are confirmed, although under another form, by ref. [25], in which
the mutual information in the minority sign χ(t) is studied.
2.6.4 Unused strategies–freezing
In the asymmetric phase, since the outcome is predictable, there is a priori6
a best strategy aµbest = −sgn〈χ|µ〉, and one expects agents to use preferably
strategies that are the most anti-correlated with 〈χ|µ〉. In other words, in
the stationary state, agents use only n strategies amongst their S strategies.
5The behavior of each agent (si(t)) is also anti-persistent in this phase.
6i.e. for an agent standing outside of the game.
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Figure 2.4: Fraction of frozen agents versus α for various system sizes (M = 5
(circles), M = 6 (squares) and M = 7 (diamonds) (average over 200 samples).
It allows to locate rather precisely the critical point.
For instance, for S = 2, some agents always use the same strategy : there
are frozen. The fraction of frozen agents φ is reported in Fig. 2.4 : it is
maximal at the critical point and exponentially decreases when α increases.
Below the critical point, due to finite size effect, some agents are also frozen.
This gives a powerful tool to locate precisely the critical point. Indeed, on
figure 2.4 φ plotted for various M crosses at one point, located at α ' 0.34,
which is indeed a good approximation to the exact value (αc = 0.3374 . . .).
For S > 2, one measures 1−n(α)/S, and also finds the same behavior as
that of φ for S = 2.
2.7 Geometrical interpretation of the coop-
eration
At this stage of the study of MG, it is often very hard to understand the rich
behavior of the model. In particular, two questions are important :
• How can cooperation arise since an agent do not know anything about
other agents, and nothing at all about the game itself ?
• Why P/N is the control parameter ?
Before exposing the exact analytical solution, it is useful to acquire its
own intuitive understanding of the (non)-cooperative behavior of agents. A
geometric approach is well suited for this task.
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Strategies can be seen as vectors of 2M components, belonging to HP ,
the hypercube of dimension P . Even if it is very hard to have a proper
representation of a hypercube of dimension P , there is at least one notion
that is commonly intuitively understood : the distance. In hypercubes, the
appropriate distance is the Hamming distance : if a and b belong to HP ,
their hamming distance is defined as
d(a, b) =
1
4P
P∑
µ=1
(aµ − bµ)2 (2.9)
and is the fraction of components that differ between a and b. There are
three interesting special cases :
• if d(a, b) = 0, a is fully correlated with b, i.e. a = b,
• if d(a, b) = 1/2, a is uncorrelated with b, and
• if d(a, b) = 1, a is anti-correlated with b, i.e. a = −b.
Note that d(a, b) is also the probability that aµ = bµ for a random µ.
Therefore, the gain of an agent is directly related to the average distance
from other agents she7 can achieve. Since large fluctuations are synonyms of
resource waste, or large losses for agents, there must be a relationship between
the fluctuations and the distance. Actually, there is a complete equivalence
between these two quantities. Indeed, the average distance between agents
is given by
〈d〉 = 1
N(N − 1)
∑
i6=j
〈d(ai, aj)〉, (2.10)
while the fluctuations can be written as a sum of random outcome plus
correlations among agents
σ2 = N +
∑
i6=j
〈aiaj〉. (2.11)
Combining both equations yields to
σ2
N
= 1− 2(N − 1)
[
〈d〉 − 1
2
]
(2.12)
This equation shows that the fluctuations and the distance are equivalent.
Hence, one can interpret the (non)-cooperative behavior as a geometrical
property. In general, it is not possible to calculate explicitely the average
distance [26].
7We consider agent alternatively as a masculine and feminin word.
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2.8 The Reduced Set of Strategies (RSS)
The previous subsection gives a first way to better understand the nature of
the fluctuations in term of the average distance. The problem is now to find
a way to evaluate the average distance. One answer comes from the Reduced
Set of Strategies (RSS). Suppose that M is not too small8 and consider one
strategy a ; change one bit of a and call the result b. Obviously a and b are
almost the same. This raises the following question : how much strategies
are really different ?
Of course there is a strategy that is definitively very different from a :
its inverse −a, but in between there are many other strategies. We give an
arbitrary criterion : two strategies a and b are said “significantly different”
if d(a, b) ≥ 1/2. Going even further, one can introduce the RSS notion : a
RSS in hypercube HP is a maximal9 set VP whose all strategies are pairwise
either uncorrelated or anti-correlated10. The central property of a RSS is :
• if a and b are uncorrelated, d(a, b) = 1/2 by definition, and
d(a,−b) = d(−a, b) = d(−a,−b) = 1/2
As a consequence, a RSS is the union of a set UP of pairwise uncorrelated
strategies and of the set UP of the opposite strategies, which are also pairwise
uncorrelated according to the central property of RSS.
2.8.1 How to build a RSS
Since a RSS VP is actually the union of UP whose all elements are mutually
uncorrelated and of UP , the set that contains the inverses of all elements of
UP , it suffices to build UP .
Let us describe in details the structure of UP . First, it is easy to see that
for fixed P , UP is not unique : for instance, take P = 1 : there are two
possible UP , namely U1 = {0} and U ′P = {1}, that makes only one RSS. In
order to show that VP is not unique, one has to go to P = 2, where there are
four UP , and two possible VP .
There is a very simple method for building U2P from UP . If a and b ∈ UP ,
one can define the direct product c = a⊗ b as
cµ =
{
aµ if 1 ≤ µ ≤ P
bµ−P if P < µ ≤ 2P . (2.13)
8M ≥ 5 is large enough
9Maximal means that it cannot contain more elements having those properties.
10Of course for fixed P there are many RSS, as we shall demonstrate.
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Figure 2.5: Normalized fluctuations versus the control parameter α = 2M/N
for the RSS (circles) and the whole set of strategies (squares)(M = 8, S = 2)
that is, c is made by appending the components of b to those of a. It is
easy to convince oneself that the elements of U2P obtained by the algorithm
• for all a in UP , put a⊗ a and a⊗ (−a) in U2P
are mutually uncorrelated if all elements of UP are mutually uncorrelated.
Finally, the RSS VP is simply UP ∪ UP .
There are generally many RSS, but given one strategy, there is only one
RSS that contains it. Therefore, the total number of RSS for a given M is
given by 2P /(2P ). The method described above gives the RSS that contains
the strategy aµ = 1 for all µ ∈ P , but it is easy to build the RSS V ′P that
contains any strategy, say, c : for all a ∈ VP , a′ such that a′µ = aµcµ belongs
to V ′P . It can been shown that the construction method given above yields
to maximal size RSS (2M+1) [22].
2.8.2 RSS in action
The best way to test the validity of the RSS concept is to carry numerical
simulations. Fig 2.5 illustrates that the macroscopic behavior of the MG is
not changed if the agents are forced to draw their strategies from a RSS11.
RSS gives a very intuitive (but wrong) interpretation of the control pa-
rameter, which was numerically found to be α = P/N . Indeed, since there
are 2P elements in VP , SN/(2P ) is the fraction of the strategy set that
11Finite size effects are more pronounced when agents draw their strategies from the
RSS.
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Figure 2.6: Normalized fluctuations versus the RSS control parameter
αRSS = 2
M+1/(NS) for S = 2 (circles), S = 3 (triangles), S = 4 (stars),
S = 5 (x) and S = 6 (diamonds)
is sampled by the agents, or more generally the average number of time a
strategy has been drawn by agents, thus RSS predicts that the RSS control
parameter is12 αRSS = 2P/(NS). Figure 2.6 shows that it is valid for small
α and large S. Hence, it is intuitive, but not completely satisfactory.
2.8.3 RSS : analytical results
RSS is a valuable tool for an intuitive analytical understanding of cooperation
and herding effects in the MG. If all agents draw their strategies in a RSS,
the average distance is simply
〈d〉 = 1
2
+
〈na〉 − 〈ns〉
2
(2.14)
where 〈ns〉 is the averaged fraction of agents using the same strategy
and 〈na〉 is the averaged fraction of agents using anti-correlated strategies.
Johnson et al. [27] call these quantities crowds, respectively anti-crowds.
Combining Eqs (2.12) with (2.14) yields
σ2/N = 1 + (N − 1)(〈ns〉 − 〈na〉) (2.15)
Eq. (2.15) shows that agents do not interact with others unless they are
correlated with others agents. It confirms the intuitive feeling that agents
using the same strategy are responsible for the herding effect, that is, the
12Remember that this makes sense only for the symmetric phase
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huge fluctuations, and anti-correlated agents reduce the fluctuations, thus
are the cause of the cooperation. For small α, 〈ns〉 dominates 〈na〉, and
reversely for α > O(1).
The RSS concept allowed to find that σ2/N ∝ 1/α for large α [20], and
finally Johnson et al. [27] found an approximated expression for σ2/N by the
following reasoning : at each time step, strategies can be sorted by their score.
By finding how many of agents whose best strategy is the k-th on the list,
they could find a reasonable approximation to σ2, namely σ2/N = 1−1/(2α)
for large α, and σ2/N = 1/(24α)[1− 1/(4P 2)] for small α Note however that
this approach only concerns the fluctuations (up to now), which are not the
only relevant quantity of the MG. However, it is highly appreciable and helps
to build one’s own understanding of MG’s behavior.
2.9 MG as a spin glass
As first noted by Savit et al. [21], σ2/N depends on the precise realization
of the MG, that is, of the composition of each agent’s set of strategies. This
behavior is analogous to that of spin glasses. And indeed, a microscopic
mathematical formulation leads to expressions for macroscopic quantities
that are similar to spin glass Hamiltonians [24]. The analogy is more striking
for the S = 2 case, because the formalism is somewhat lighter. Therefore, in
the following, we shall always begin with this case, and afterwards generalize
the discussions to any S. For mathematical reasons, we will mainly consider
the linear payoff function G(x) = x 13. Note that with this choice, the
fluctuations are simply the total losses of agents per time step :
σ2 = 〈A2〉 =
N∑
i=1
〈aiA〉 = −
N∑
i=1
gi (2.16)
where by definition gi = −〈aiA〉 is the gain rate of agent i. For S = 2,
in addition to the symmetry between the two choices14, one can exploit the
symmetry between the two strategies that each agent possesses. Instead of
si = 1, 2, one relabels the strategies by si = −1, 1, or with a more graphical
notation, si =↓, ↑. This choice underlines at best the spin nature of the
model. In addition since the strategies are independently drawn, given a
history, with probability 1/2, both strategies of an agent stipulate the same
decision, thus one can separate the constant part ωµi of agent i decisions from
their variable component ξµi , so that
13The overall structure of the MG is not changed by particular choices of payoff function.
14Which is already exploited by labelling them −1 and +1
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aµi,s = ω
µ
i + ξ
µ
i s (2.17)
where
ωµi =
1
2
(ai,↑ + ai,↓) and ξ
µ
i =
1
2
(ai,↑ − ai,↓) (2.18)
Note that ωµi , the constant part, and ξ
µ
i , the variable part, are not
independent : only one is different from zero given a history µ. The symmetry
between the two strategies is further exploited by introducing
∆i(t) = Ui,↑(t)− Ui,↓(t) (2.19)
At time t, agent i use the strategy si(t) given by
si(t) = sgn∆(t) (2.20)
The constant decisions of all agents have an influence on A : it also
consists of a constant part and a variable one
Aµ(t)(t) =
N∑
i
[ω
µ(t)
i + ξ
µ(t)
i si(t)] = Ω
µ(t) +
N∑
i
ξ
µ(t)
i si(t) (2.21)
This equation already gives the key element which is at the origin of the
behavior the model. The constant part Ωµ of A is a bias, and induces an
a priori asymmetry in the outcome. When the model is in the symmetric
phase, agents are able to remove this asymmetry. In the asymmetric phase,
this is no more possible for them, and they reach a stationary state where
they cooperate. One concludes that cooperation itself is due to symmetry
breaking itself due to Ωµ, that is, to the fact that for each history µ, there
are agents who always take the same decision. Note that in the asymmetric
phase, 〈A|µ〉 is completely correlated with Ωµ. The order parameter Θ is a
measure of the asymmetry induced by the Ωs, which is convenient for a sgn
payoff function, but for a linear payoff function, one prefers to use
H =
P∑
µ=1
ρµ〈A〉2 = 〈A〉2 (2.22)
Such functions measure the presence of available information, which can
be detected by agents’ strategies and accordingly exploited by them. With
this notation, one can explicitly expand σ2 and H
σ2 = Ω2 +
N∑
i=1
ξiΩ〈si〉+
N∑
i,j=1
ξiξj〈sisj〉 (2.23)
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H = Ω2 +
N∑
i=1
ξiΩ〈si〉+
N∑
i,j=1
ξiξj〈si〉〈sj〉 = 〈A〉2 (2.24)
Defining
hi = Ωξi and Ji,j = ξiξj (2.25)
one obtains
σ2 = Ω2 +
N∑
i=1
hi〈si〉+
N∑
i,j=1
Ji,j〈sisj〉 (2.26)
H = Ω2 +
N∑
i=1
hi〈si〉+
N∑
i,j=1
Ji,j〈si〉〈sj〉 (2.27)
The field hi measures the difference of correlation of the two strategies
with Ωµ whereas the coupling Ji,j accounts for the interaction between agents
as well as for agents self-interaction (Ji,i). The structure of the couplings
(2.25) is reminiscent of neural networks models [28] where ξµi play the role of
memory patterns. This similarity confirms the conclusion of refs. [21, 23, 22]
that the relevant parameter is the ratio α = P/N between the number of
patterns and the number of spins.
Both σ2 and H look like disordered Hamiltonians where the ξi and ωi —
the strategies — play the role of the quenched disorder, while the spins si
are dynamical variables. The constant part of Aµ acts like a magnetic field.
When it is too strong with respect to agents’ ability to exploit and remove
it, there is residual magnetic field with which agents try to be anti-aligned.
When agents removed information, the effective magnetic field is zero : there
is no more a privileged direction in the answer space {−1, 1}P .
Note that H and σ2 only differ by the diagonal term of the last summation
σ2
N
=
H
N
+
1
N
N∑
i
Ji,i(1− 〈si〉2) ' H
N
+
1
2
(1−Q) (2.28)
where Q =
∑
i〈si〉2/N is the self overlap, which is related to the way agents
use their strategies : if all agent are frozen, Q = 1, whereas Q = 0 means
that all agents use their two strategies with the same frequency. The approx-
imation made above holds for large system sizes.
For S > 2, the decomposition of Eq (2.17) cannot be done, but the above
discussion is still valid. In particular, with probability 1/2S−1 all strategies
of an agent give the same decision, thus the total outcome is still a sum of
constant and variable parts, the constant part being smaller, explaining why
the phase transition occurs at higher α and why the cooperation is less and
less intense as S is increased.
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All quantities have to be expressed by vectors. For instance, strategies’
set of agent i is labelled by ~ai, and the strategy used by ~si(t) ∈ {0, 1}S
(note that only one component is different from zero at any time), so that
agent i takes the decision ~si(t).~a
µ
i . The time average can also be defined
〈~si〉 = (〈ski 〉)k. With this notation,
〈aµi 〉 = 〈~si〉.~ai =⇒ 〈A|µ〉 =
∑
i
〈~si〉.~aµi (2.29)
and
H = 〈A〉2 = ∑
µ
ρµ (〈~si〉.~aµi )2 (2.30)
The fluctuations are, by definition,
σ2 = 〈A2〉 = ∑
µ
ρµ〈
(∑
i
aµsi,i
)2
〉 (2.31)
For this case we adopt a slightly different definition of the self-overlap
G =
1
N
∑
i
|〈~si〉|2 = 1
N
∑
i
S∑
k=1
〈ski 〉2 (2.32)
If all agents play pure strategies G = 1 whereas G = 1/S if 〈ski 〉 = 1/S
∀i, k. Therefore 1/G is a measure of the “effective” number of strategies that
agents play on average. Eq. (2.28) becomes
σ2
N
=
H
N
+ 1−G− 1
N
∑
i
∑
k,k′ 6=k
〈ski 〉〈sk
′
i 〉ai,sai,s′ ∼=
H
N
+ 1−G (2.33)
where in the last relation we neglected terms which vanish in the limit N →
∞ (because ai,sai,s′ ∼ P−1/2 for s 6= s′). Eq. (2.33) means that the loss of
agents come either from the asymmetry H which they produce or from the
stochastic fluctuations of their choices. Indeed if agents play pure strategies,
G = 1 and the last term vanishes. Put differently, the stochastic fluctuations
σ2 of the market – or volatility – has a systematic contribution H arising from
unexploited asymmetries and a stochastic one 1− G, which is generated by
stochastic choice of agents.
2.10 Exponential learning
The original formulation of the MG was aimed at being the most simple
possible, and indeed the MG is very easy to introduce with simple words.
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But simplicity is a relative notion : mathematically speaking, it is defined
with discontinuous functions for the payoff (sgn(x)) and the used strategies
(arg max). While the first difficulty is easily overcome by taking a linear
payoff function, the second one is still to be fixed in order to describe further
mathematically the MG. The idea is to replace the use-the-best-strategy rule
by a probabilistic use of strategies, where at time t, each strategy s of agent i
is played with probability pii,s(t) ∈ ∆N , so that each agent i behavior at time
t is characterized by the vector15 ~pii of components pii,s. Inductive agents as
defined in the MG use their strategies according to a reinforcing scheme [30],
that is, more rewarding strategies are more likely to be used. By definition
of probabilities
pii,s(t) =
f(Ui,s(t))∑N
s′=1 f(Ui,s′(t))
(2.34)
where f(x) is a monotonously growing function of x. The most simple choice
is to consider f(x) = x, but is not convenient, since it requires that all
the payoffs are positive. Another one very handy choice is f(x) = exp(Γx)
16 ; this particular choice is familiar both to physicists and economists : the
former call it Boltzmann distribution where Γ is the inverse of a temperature,
while the latter know it as the Logit model, or exponential learning [31]. The
use-the-best-strategy is recovered in the Γ →∞ limit.
In principle, one should avoid introducing new parameters in the MG if
one aims to study it as originally defined, since in most cases it will also
introduce a supplementary source of confusion. However, as we shall show
in the next sections, this probabilistic formulation does not change the sta-
tionary state of the MG, when it exists, that is, the asymptotic behavior of
the MG in the asymmetric phase does not depend on Γ. In the symmetric
phase, however, it does change the behavior of the MG.
For S = 2, only one pii,s is needed and it is handful to let
mi(t) = pii,↑(t)− pii,↓(t) = tanh[Γ(Ui,↑(t)− Ui,↓(t))] = tanh[Γ∆i(t)] (2.35)
so that mi ∈ [−1, 1] is the time average of si in the stationary state ; it can
be thought as a soft spin, i.e. as a spin that can take continuous values.
15also called mixed strategies profile in the language of Game Theory.
16This probabilistic choice has been first considered in the MG context in ref. [29].
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2.11 Continuous time limit
— “thermodynamic” limit
In the following, we shall restrict to the case of linear payoff, and discuss
the general case in chapter 3.1. The continuous time should be a variable
independent from the size of the systems, therefore one has to find what is
the intrinsic time scale of the discrete MG, if there is any.
A direct clue of the existence of a time scale is given by the anti-persistent
behavior of the MG in the symmetric phase : the time correlation function
of the minority sign conditional to a history oscillates with a 2P period,
thus there is a time scale in MG, proportional to P . Another argument is
to observe that the behavior of agents depends on the scores of their strate-
gies ; the scores Ui,s are sums of sub-scores U
µ
i,s which all have roughly the
same importance, therefore, the number of time steps needed to significantly
change Ui,s is proportional to P , in all phases. Hence, the proper time is the
rescaled time
τ = t/P, (2.36)
which becomes continuous in the P → ∞ limit ; equivalently, achieving a
given proper time difference δτ requires τP discrete time steps, that even-
tually diverges in the P → ∞ limit. This implies that the continuous time
limit is only valid if the system is in a stationary state, that is, if its state do
not change significantly during δτP time steps. As it turns out at first sight,
it is only the case in the asymmetric phase17.
Since α = P/N is the control parameter of the system, the “thermody-
namic” limit consists of taking P, N →∞ while keeping their ratio constant
and equal to α ; this is noted by limth . All quantities have to remain finite
in the thermodynamic limit. The normalized fluctuations are noted by
σ2c = 〈(Ac)2〉 = limth
σ2
N
= limth
〈A2〉
N
(2.37)
Strategies scores have to be normalized by a factor 1/P (see below), yielding
U ci,s(τ) = limth
Ui,s(t)
P
(2.38)
All dynamical equations can now be rewritten in the continuous time
formulation. The proper continuous time limit of U ci,s is the central part of
the reformulation
U ci,s(τ + δτ)− U ci,s(τ)
δτ
= limth − 1
δτP
(τ+δτ)P−1∑
t=τP
a
µ(t)
i,s A
µ(t)(t) (2.39)
17In fact, it is also true for the symmetric phase with Γ  1 (see below).
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By the law of large numbers, since the fluctuations of the discrete scores are
Gaussian, they vanishes in the thermodynamic limit [35], thus,
U˙ ci,s(τ) = −ai,s〈A〉 (2.40)
This equations shows why the rescaling factor of the scores is P : in the
asymmetric phase, the sum over the histories gives a factor of order
√
P ,
while the one over the agents a factor of order
√
N .
Note that the average over the histories µ is now an integration. The
dynamics of S = 2 agents is given by
m˙i = −Γ(1−m2i )∆i (2.41)
where ∆ci = 2ξi〈A〉. The calculus for any S is easy and gives [35]
dpii,s
dτ
= −Γipii,s
[
ai,s〈A〉 − 〈ai〉〈A〉
]
(2.42)
This equation simply states that the probability of use of a strategy increases
if it yields a higher payoff than the payoff averaged over all the agent’s strate-
gies. In the following, the c indices will be dropped, but shall remain present
in the mind of the reader when needed. In addition, we shall note integrations
by summations, for the sake of simplicity.
2.12 Minimization of available information
The MG with linear payoff admits as Lyapunov function available informa-
tion H. Indeed for S = 2, one has [32]
dH
dτ
=
∑
i
∂H
∂mi
m˙i = −
∑
i
Γ(1−m2i )∆2i < 0 (2.43)
since ∂H/∂mi = ∆i. For any S, the derivation is a bit lengthier, and
after some algebra one can write [35]
dH
dτ
=
∑
i,s
∂H
∂pii,s
· dpii,s
dτ
= −2∑
i
Γi
S∑
s=1
pii,s

dUi,s
dτ
− ~pii · d
~Ui
dτ


2
< 0. (2.44)
Eqs (2.43) and (2.44) are a milestone in the understanding of MG. In
addition, they imply that in the stationary state (dH/dτ = 0) each of the
strategies played by agent i – those with pii,s > 0 – has the same perceived
success rate dUi,s
dτ
in the long run (see below for a discussion of this point).
Finally, note that the constant Γ is a learning rate that can be incorporated
into the proper time. Therefore, the stationary state, when it exists, does
not depend on its precise value [32, 35, 33].
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2.13 Algebraic interpretation of the phase tran-
sition
As shown in the previous section, agents try to minimize available informa-
tion H[32, 35], and can actually cancel it when α < αc. One can algebraically
explain why this occurs, that is, why depending on α they can or cannot re-
move the information. In addition, the algebraic approach gives another
rigorous proof that α is the control parameter for the MG.
Since H is a sum of P non negative averages 〈A〉2, H = 0 only if all
averages are zero, namely 〈A〉 = 0 ∀µ, or equivalently
N∑
i=1
ξµi 〈si〉 = −Ωµ ∀µ (2.45)
These are P linear equations in N variables. However the N variables
mi = 〈si〉 are restricted to the [−1, 1] interval. Above αc there are Nφ vari-
ables which are frozen at the boundary of this interval (mi = ±1). Therefore
there are (1− φ)N free variables only. As shown in refs. [32, 35], the point
αc marks the transition below which the system of equations (2.45) becomes
degenerate, i.e. when there are more variables than equations. Exactly at
αc the number of free variables (1 − φ)N exactly matches the number of
equations P . Dividing this equation by N gives an equation for αc,
αc = 1− φ (2.46)
which is indeed confirmed numerically to a high accuracy.
When α < αc, there are much more free variables (N indeed) than equa-
tions : the solutions of Eqs. (2.45) then belong to a subspace of dimension
N − P . This allows the anti-persistent behavior to take place, because the
system is free to move on this subspace.
This means that if agents draw their strategies in such a way that they
have no bias (Ωµ = 0), the linear system of equation is then homogeneous
and the solution 〈si〉 = 0 always exists for all i’s, implying that the system is
always in the symmetric phase, and there is no phase transition. In partic-
ular, if α > 1, the trivial solution is unique, hence σ2/N = 1. When α < 1,
a subspace of solutions of dimension N − P arises, and the anti-persistent
behavior also takes place. These predictions are fully confirmed by figure
2.718.
18Actually, σ2/N appears to be slightly lower than 1 for α ∼ 1 : this is a finite size
effect.
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Figure 2.7: Normalized fluctuations versus α (M = 6, S = 2, average over
50 samples).
This argument easily generalizes to S > 2 strategies[35] (see also appendix
8.2). If agents use, on average, n(S) strategies (and S − n(S) are never
used) the number of free variables is Nn(S). There are P plus N equations
which these have to satisfy, where the latter N comes from the normalization
condition on the frequency with which each strategy is used. At the critical
point, these two numbers are equal, and we find
nc(S) = αc(S) + 1. (2.47)
At the critical point nearly one half of the strategies yield positive virtual
gain and are used, whereas the others are not used. From this we find
αc(S) ∼= αc(2) + S
2
− 1 (2.48)
This shows that actually αc grows linearly with S, but in a slightly less
simple way than the prediction given by the RSS (αc(S) ∝ S).
2.14 Microscopic behavior
The mathematical formulation derived above allow us to explore analytically
the microscopic behavior of agents ; for instance, it gives a general expla-
nation of freezing, and of how the gain of an agent depends on his set of
strategies as well as on his behavior.
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2.14.1 Asymmetric phase
Unused strategies–Freezing
Numerical simulations showed that for large system sizes, some agents only
use a subset of their strategies in the asymmetric phase. In particular, for
S = 2, such agents use one strategy — they are frozen [24].
In the asymmetric phase, an agent can detect and exploit available in-
formation if one of her’s strategies is more correlated with 〈A|µ〉 than the
other. More precisely, we observe that if vi ≡ 〈∆i,t+1 −∆i,t〉/2 6= 0 then
∆i,t ' vit grows linearly with time, and the agent’s spin will always take the
value si = sign vi. We find
vi = −〈ξµti A(t)〉 = −hi −
N∑
j=1
Ji,j〈sj〉 (2.49)
Note that this is consistent with the dynamical equations in continuous
time (2.35) : the stationary state corresponds to m˙i = 0 for all i, there are
only two possibilities
• ∆ci = 0, so to say, both strategies of agent i yield the same average
score in the long run and she uses both of them,
• ∆ci 6= 0, which implies that m2i = 1, that is, agent i is frozen.
It is instructive to consider first the case where other agents than agent i
choose by coin tossing (i.e. 〈sj〉 = 0 for j 6= i) so that vi = −hi − Ji,i〈si〉. If
vi 6= 0 then
si = sign vi = −sign (hi + Ji,i〈si〉). (2.50)
But this last equation has a solution only if
|hi| > Ji,i (2.51)
whereas otherwise |〈si〉| < 1 and vi = 0. For large system sizes, Ji,i ' 1/2
and that hi can be approximated by a Gaussian variable with zero average
and variance (4α)−1. This means that |hi|  Ji,i for α  1, which implies
that most agents have 〈si〉 ≈ 0 in this limit and we can indeed neglect agent–
agent interaction. This allows to compute the probability for an agent to be
frozen
φ = P{|hi| > Ji,i} ∝ e−α/2, (2.52)
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Figure 2.8: Strength of effective field hi relative to self impact Ji,i versus the
time of last change of strategies for all agents (M = 8, N = 511, S = 2).
for α  1. Numerical simulations show that φ ∝ e−(0.37±0.02)α indeed decays
exponentially. As α → ∞, the random agents limit is reacheded because
〈si〉 → 0 for all i and 〈sisj〉 = 〈si〉〈sj〉 for i 6= j. By Eq. (2.18) we find
σ2 =
∑
µ
(Ωµ)2/P +
∑
i
Ji,i ' N. (2.53)
The same argument applies in general, with the difference that the “bare”
field hi must be replaced by the “effective” field h˜i = hi +
∑
j 6=i Ji,j〈sj〉. In
order for agent i to get frozen, her effective field h˜i must overcome the self
interaction Ji,i, i.e.
|h˜i| > Ji,i ' 1/2. (2.54)
If this condition is met, si = −sign h˜i. Fig. 2.8 reports that the criterion
given by Eq (2.54) is indeed correct.
In addition, a frozen agent, on average, receives a larger payoff than an
unfrozen agent (see next section). Loosely speaking, one can say that a frozen
agent has a good and a bad strategy and the good one remains better than
the bad one even when she actually uses it. On the contrary, unfrozen agents
have two strategies each of which seems better than the other when it is not
adopted. In this sense, symmetry breaking in the outcome induces a sort of
breakdown in the a priori equivalence of agents’ strategies.
This discussion is easily generalized to S > 2 ; in the asymmetric phase,
some agents only use n < S strategies. Eq (2.34) implies that in the station-
ary state, all used strategies yield the same average score.
We focus on one agent, say i, and assume that others play their strategies
according to some stationary probability distribution ~pi−i. If µ(t) is drawn
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randomly from ρµ we can consider the decisions of all other agents A
µ(t)
−i (t) =∑
j 6=i a
µ
j,sj(t)
(t) as a stationary process19. Since we deal with one agent, we
shall drop the subscript i. In the long run the perceived performance of
strategy s is
〈Us(t + 1)− Us(t)〉 = 〈∆Us〉 = −as〈A−i〉 − ~pi · ~aas
∼= −as〈A−i〉 − pis (2.55)
where the approximation in Eq. (2.55) holds for P  1 since as′as ∼ 1/
√
P
for s′ 6= s. Because of Eq. (2.34), strategies can either
i) have pis > 0 and 〈∆Us〉 = v independent of s or
ii) have pis = 0 and 〈∆Us〉 < v.
This can be understood by a rather simple argument : Imagine that strat-
egy 1 has 〈∆U1〉 > v. Then by the very learning dynamics, the agent shall use
strategy 1 more frequently than others and hence pi1 shall increase. Because
of the last term in Eq. (2.55) that will decrease the perceived performance
〈∆U1〉 of that strategy. On the other hand, if 〈∆U1〉 < v the agent shall use
it less frequently, hence its 〈∆U1〉 shall increase. If 〈∆U1〉 < v even when
pi1 → 0 then the agents will never play that strategy, i.e. pi1 = 0.
Let n ≤ S be the number of strategies with pis > 0 and let these be
labeled by s = 1, . . . , n, whereas pik = 0 for k > n. Taking the sum of Eq.
(2.55) on s = 1, . . . , n we find
v = − 1
n
n∑
s=1
as〈A−i〉 − 1
n
where n is fixed by the condition v > −ak〈A−i〉 for all k > n. Clearly
−as〈A−i〉 > v > −ak〈A−i〉 for any s ≤ n and k > n hence the n strategies
which the agent uses are the n more efficient ones. Then Eq. (2.55) becomes
pis =
1
n
+
(
1
n
n∑
s′=1
as′〈A−i〉 − as〈A−i〉
)
,
meaning that strategies with a larger −as〈A−i〉 are played more frequently.
19Leading to an effective external action, similar in essence to the effective external field
h˜i for S = 2.
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Gain
In this section we show how the behavior and the gain of each agent depends
on her microscopic constitution and on the asymmetry of the outcome A(t) in
the asymmetric phase. Let us denote the gain of agent i by gi ; by definition,
gi = −〈Aai〉. (2.56)
In the asymmetric phase, since the stationary state is of mean field nature,
〈sisj〉 = mimj for S = 2. Consequently, by expanding Eq. (2.56) one obtains
gi = −〈A〉ωi − 〈Asi〉ξi
= −〈A〉ωi − 〈A〉ξimi − ξ2i (1−m2i ). (2.57)
The stationary behavior of agent i is described by vi = −〈A〉ξi. If an agent is
non frozen, vi = 0, while mi = −sgnvi otherwise, hence the gain of a generic
agent i is
gi = −〈A〉ωi + |〈A〉ξi| − ξ2i (1−m2i ). (2.58)
Note that the second term of the above equation vanishes for a non frozen
agent j and therefore
gj = −〈A〉ωj − ξ2j (1−m2j) non frozen. (2.59)
On the other hand, the third term of Eq. (2.58) vanishes if agent k is frozen :
gk = −〈A〉ωk + |〈A〉ξk| frozen. (2.60)
In Eqs (2.59) and (2.60), the gain of each agent is expressed as her internal
constitution, allowing us to interpret what does the gain of a general agent
depends on. In both equations, the first term −〈A〉ωi, which represents how
much the agents lose due to their bias, is on average negative, due to the
impact this bias has on the market. The second term in Eq (2.59) is always
negative, and represents the losses due to the switching between strategies,
which arises from the neglect of market impact.
By contrast, the term ξ2k(1 − m2k) disappears for a frozen agent because
m2k = 1. It is replaced by |〈A〉ξk| which is always positive and which measures
how well agent k exploits available information. Therefore, on average, the
frozen agents gain more than the non frozen ones. This is clearly illustrated
by figure 2.9 which also shows that Eqs. (2.59) and (2.60) are exact.
For S > 2, the same discussion can be handled. The average payoff
g = −~pi · ~a〈A−i〉 − 1 delivered is
g = − 1
n
n∑
s=1
as〈A−i〉+
n∑
s=1
(
as〈A−i〉 − 1
n
n∑
s′=1
as′〈A−i〉
)2
− 1 (2.61)
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Figure 2.9: Theoretical gain versus experimental gain showing that the frozen
agents gain more than the active ones (α = 0.5, M = 6)
With some more algebra, it is easy to check that g increases as n decreases :
the less strategies she uses, the more she gains on average.
2.14.2 Symmetric phase
In the symmetric phase, the learning parameter Γ has an influence on the
final state. It is known that for large Γ, a stationary state is attained in all
phases [32, 35], and that the behavior of the original MG is recovered in the
Γ → ∞ limit. This subsection is devoted to discuss the dependence of the
behavior on the MG on Γ for the S = 2 case [36], even if the discussion can
be easily extented to any S.
Learning rate
When agents have no memory (P = 1), or equivalently no information, there
are two different strategies, and agents again draw their strategies from this
set of strategies.
Suppose that they have no prior beliefs: ∆i(0) = 0. Hence ∆i(t) ≡ y(t)/Γ
is the same for all agents. Consider now y(t) = Γ∆i(t) : it satisfies the
equation
y(t + 1) = y(t)− 1
N
N∑
i=1
ai(t)
' y(t)− Γ tanh[y(t)] + O(N−1/2)
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Figure 2.10: Graphical iteration of the map y(t) for Γ = 1.8 < Γc and
Γ = 2.5 > Γc
Neglecting the last term, which is legitimate for large N , we find a dy-
namical system. The point y0 = 0 is stationary, but it is easy to see that
it is only stable for Γ < Γc = 2. For Γ > 2, a cycle of period 2 arises,
as shown in figure 2.10. This has dramatic effects on the optimality of the
system. Indeed, let ±y∗ be the two values of y(t) in this cycle. Because of
the symmetry y(t + 1) = −y(t) = ±y∗ we still have 〈A〉 = 0. On the other
hand σ2 = N2y∗2 is of order N2, which is even worse than the symmetric
Nash equilibrium where σ2 = N .
This transiton from a state where σ2 ∝ N to a state with σ2 ∝ N2 is
generic in the minority game.
Learning rate in the MG
The simple approach followed above can be generalized to the full minority
game and it allows to derive the critical learning rate Γc(α) as a function of
the parameter α of the MG.
As before, the performance of agents may be worse if they are too reactive.
This is shown numerically in figure 4.4. The effect is exactly the same as
that discussed previously, in the absence of information (P = 1): As the
learning rate Γ increases, the stationary solution ∆∗i looses its stability and
a bifurcation to a complex dynamics occurs. This is only possible in the low
α phase, where the stationary state is degenerate and the system can attain
〈A|µ〉 = 0 by hopping between different states20. The plot of A(t + 1)/N vs
20In the asymmetric phase α > αc the stationary state is unique and this effect is not
possible.
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Figure 2.11: Plot of A(t+1)/N vs A(t)/N for the MG with N = 301 agents,
Γ = ∞ and P = 16 (α = 0.053 . . .).
A(t)/N , in figure 2.11 shows that indeed wild fluctuations occur in one time
step: a finite fraction of agents change their mind at each time step. This is
what causes, for fixed P , the cross over from the linear regime σ2 ∼ N to a
quadratic dependence σ2 ∼ N2.
Clearly the continuum time limit, on which our analysis rests, breaks
down. Still one can compute the critical learning rate Γc(α) which marks the
onset of complex dynamics. Let us focus attention on one value of µ = 1 and
on the learning model of Eq. (2.40). Let us define the sequence of times tk
such that µ(tk) = 1 for the k
th time. Hence we define yi(k) = Γ∆i(tk), which
satisfies
yi(k + 1) = yi(k)− Γ
P
tk+1−1∑
t=tk
A(t)ξ
µ(t)
i (2.62)
When N  1, the sum involves ∼ P = αN  1 terms and we may
estimate it by the law of large numbers. Let y∗i be the solution of Eq. (2.62),
then we can set yi(k) = y
∗
i + δyi(k) and study the linear stability of this
solution. With the notation R =
∑
µ R
µ/P , we find
δyi(k + 1) =
N∑
j=1
Ti,jδyj(k), Ti,j = δi,j − αΓξiξj(1−m2j) (2.63)
where mj = tanh(y
∗
j ). The solution y
∗
i is stable if the eigenvalues of Ti,j are
all smaller than 1 in absolute value. As Γ increases, the smallest eigenvalue
of Ti,j becomes smaller that −1. Thanks to the results in ref. [37], we have an
analytic expression for this eigenvalue, which is λ+ = 1−Γ(1+α1/2)2(1−Q)/2.
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Figure 2.12: Phase diagram of the MG (ηi = 0) in the (α, Γ) plane.
The stability condition λ+ > −1 then turns into
Γ < Γc(α) ≡ 4
[1−Q(α)](1 +√α)2 , Q(α) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
m2i (2.64)
which is our desired result. The function Q(α) is known exaclty from the
analytic solution [32, 35]. This yields a phase diagram in the (α, Γ) plane
which is shown in figure 2.12. For α → 0 we find21 Γc → 4. As α →
αc, Γc converges to a finite value (' 7.0273 . . .) with infinite slope. In the
asymmetric phase (α > αc) the dynamics is always smooth, hence Γc(α) =
∞.
2.15 Exact solution
The exact solution exposed in this section only applies to MG having a sta-
tionary state, that is, MG in the asymmetric phase, and MG in the symmetric
phase with Γ  1. For these MG, the stationary state is obtained after the
minimization of H, a quadratic form of its variables {pi,s}, on which there
are N conditions of normalization. This kind of problem is called quadratic
programming and no simple general solution is known. However, in the ther-
modynamic limit, Statistical Physics gives exact results. The method is the
following : one considers H as a Hamiltonian and tries to find its ground
21This differs from our previous result Γc = 2 without information, because with P = 1
in the MG half of the population has a+,i = a−,i two equal strategies. This reduces by a
factor 2 the effective number of adaptive agents, and accordingly Γc takes a factor 2.
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state. Statistical physics tells us that if one finds its partition function
Z(β) = Tre−βH , (2.65)
one also knows the free energy F = 1/β ln Z, which gives the ground state
energy in the zero temperature β → ∞ limit. The problem here is that
one does not know how to calculate exactly Z for each realization of the
quenched disorder – strategies. Thermodynamic quantities are independent
from the precise realization of the disorder in the thermodynamic limit, thus
the goal is now to compute the averaged free energy over the disorder in the
thermodynamic limit, that is, to compute 〈ln Z〉. Unfortunately, such kind of
average is exceedingly — when not impossible — difficult to calculate. One
can use the replica trick, which consists of exploiting the identity
〈lnx〉 = lim
n→0
〈xn〉 − 1
n
(2.66)
with x = Z(β). Physically, averaging Zn over the disorder is equivalent to
taking n replica of the same system, i.e. n same realizations of the disorder,
and N spins for each realizations, hence the name. Of course the n → 0 limit
is to be considered as formal only22.
Here, we expose the method for doing the replica calculus for the basic
MG with S = 2. In the following, for each exactly solvable extension of the
MG, the whole calculus has to be redone, but the method remains overall
the same.
2.15.1 Solution for uniformly sampled histories
As originally defined, the MG is a closed system, where the pieces of informa-
tion are dynamically created by agents, so that the MG is a closed dynamical
system, implying that the solution has to be self-consistent. Consequently,
the idea of Cavagna [38] — replacing the dynamical creation of histories by
an external random process — was thought as a great simplification of the
problem and as the door to an analytical description. It is very interest-
ing since the overall structure of the MG apparently only weakly depends on
whether the histories are real or completely random (see Fig. 2.13). However
as it is showed hereafter, Cavagna’s claim that “all quantities of the minority
game are completely independent from the memory of agents” is incorrect in
most cases. Indeed, as it appears from the exact solution, all the quantities
22Historically, this limit is the source of very animated discussions between physicists
and also between physicists and mathematicians. The replica trick gives correct results in
the case of the MG, but there are many other cases for which this question is still open.
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depend on the distribution function of ρµ, the frequencies of appearance of
the history µ. Hereafter follows the solution for random histories (ρµ = 1/P )
[32].
The first step is to average Zn over the strategies’ disorder, that is, to
obtain 〈Zn(β)〉. Each replica b has its own set of dynamical variables si,b.
〈Zn(β)〉a = Trs
∏
µ,c
〈e−ρµβ(Aµb )2〉a (2.67)
where the average is over the disorder variables aµi,s and Trs is the trace
on the variables si,c for all i and b. With the random history process, ρ
µ = 0
for all µ.
Following standard procedures [53, 52], we introduce a Gaussian variable
zµb so that we can linearize the exponent in Eq. (2.67).
〈Zn(β)〉a = Trs
∏
µ
〈e−i
√
2β
P
∑
b
zµ
b
Aµ
b 〉a,z (2.68)
This allows us to carry out the averages over a’s explicitly
〈Zn(β)〉a '
N∏
j=1
∏
µ
e
− β
2α
∑
b,d
zµ
b
dµ
b [1+
1
N
∑
i
si,bsi,d] (2.69)
to leading order in N . Then we introduce new variables Qb,d and rb,d with
the identity
1 =
∫
dQb,dδ
(
Qb,d − 1
N
∑
i
si,bsi,d
)
∝
∫
drb,ddQb,de
−αβ2
2
rb,d(NQb,d−
∑
i
si,bsi,d)
for all b ≥ d, which allow us to write the partition function as :
〈Zn(β)〉 =
∫
dQˆdrˆe−Nnβf(Qˆ,rˆ)
with
f(Qˆ, rˆ) =
α
2nβ
Tr log Tˆ +
αβ
2n
∑
b≤d
rb,dQb,d
− 1
nβ
log
[
Trse
αβ2
2
∑
b≤d
rb,dsbsd
]
. (2.70)
The matrix Tˆ is given by
Tb,d = δb,d +
β
α
[1 + Qb,d] .
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With the replica symmetric ansatz
Qb,d = q + (Q− q)δb,d, rb,d = 2r + (R− 2r)δb,d
the matrix Tˆ has n − 1 degenerated eigenvalues λ0 = 1 + β(1−q)α and one
eigenvalue equal to λ1 = n
β(1+q)
α
+1+ β(1−q)
α
therefore, after standard algebra,
f(q, r) =
α
2β
log
[
1 +
β(Q− q)
α
]
+
α[1 + q]
2α + β(Q− q) +
αβ
2
(RQ− rq)
− 1
β
〈log
∫ 1
−1
dse−βVz(s)〉 (2.71)
where we found it convenient to define the “potential”
Vz(s) = −αβ(R− r)
2
s2 −√αr z s (2.72)
so that the last term of f looks like the free energy of a particle in the interval
[−1, 1] with potential Vz(s) where z plays the role of disorder.
The saddle point equations are given by :
∂f
∂q
= 0 ⇒ r = 1 + q
[α + β(Q− q)]2 (2.73)
∂f
∂Q
= 0 ⇒ β(R− r) = − 1
α + β(Q− q) (2.74)
∂f
∂R
= 0 ⇒ Q = 〈〈s2〉s〉z (2.75)
∂f
∂r
= 0 ⇒ β(Q− q) = 〈〈sz〉s〉z√
αr
(2.76)
where 〈·〉s stands for a thermal average over the above mentioned one particle
system. This average is actually over the distribution function of the mi.
In the limit β → 0 we can look for a solution with q → Q and r → R. It
is convenient to define
χ =
β(Q− q)
α
, and ζ = −
√
α
r
β(R− r) (2.77)
and to require that they stay finite in the limit β → ∞. The averages are
easily evaluated since, in this case, they are dominated by the minimum of
the potential Vz(s) =
√
αr(ζs2/2 − zs) for s ∈ [−1, 1]. The minimum is at
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s = −1 for z ≤ −ζ and at s = +1 for z ≥ ζ. For −ζ < z < ζ the minimum
is at s = z/ζ. With this we find
〈〈sz〉〉 = 1
ζ
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
(2.78)
and
〈〈s2〉〉 = Q = 1−
√
2
pi
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
−
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
(2.79)
The pdf of the mi is
P(m) = φ(z)
2
[δ(m− 1) + δ(m + 1)] + z√
2pi
e−(zm)
2/2 (2.80)
with z =
√
α/(1 + Q) (Q taking its saddle point value) and where φ(z) =
1− Erf(z/√2) is the fraction of frozen agents.
With some more algebra, one easily finds :
χ =
[
α/erf
(
ζ√
2
)
− 1
]−1
(2.81)
Finally ζ is fixed as a function of α by the equation√
2
pi
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
+
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
+
α
ζ2
= 2 (2.82)
Eq. (2.81) means that χ diverges when α → α+c , which then implies that
at the critical point
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
= α = αc. (2.83)
This back in the other saddle point equations, yields the following equation
for ζ = ζc : √
2
pi
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
+ erf
(
ζ√
2
)
= 2. (2.84)
The free energy, at the saddle point, for β →∞, is equal to Hc, available
information, thus
Hc =
1 + Q
2(1 + χ)2
(2.85)
where Qc and χ take their saddle point values (Eqs. (2.79) and (2.81)). The
fluctuations are simply given by
σ2c = Hc +
1
2
(1−Q) (2.86)
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Figure 2.13: Normalized fluctuations (top) and available information (below)
versus the control parameter α (S = 2, M = 6 (circles), M = 7 (squares)
and M = 8 (diamonds), 300P iterations, average over 100 samples). The
continuous lines are theoretical predictions from the exact solution.
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Figure 2.14: Fraction of frozen players from numerical simulation (M =
8, 300P iterations, average over 200 samples). The continuous line is the
theoretical prediction from the exact solution.
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Figure 2.15: Scaled normalized fluctuations versus α(S) + 1− S/2, showing
that σ2/N → 1− 1/α when α  1 for S = 2 (circles), S = 3 (squares) and
S = 4 (diamonds) (M = 10, 300P iterations, average over 100 samples). The
continuous lines are theoretical predictions from the exact solution.
Fig. 2.13 and 2.14 report that the theoretical predictions fully agree with
these equations.
The exact solution for stationary states can be extended to any S (see
appendix 8.2), and also yields excellent results. Note that for all S, σ2/N '
1− 1/α for α  1 (see Fig. 2.15).
2.15.2 Solution for real histories
The dynamical process on histories does matter. Indeed, by doing careful
numerical simulations, one clearly sees that in the asymmetric phase, σ2/N
and H/N do depend on the nature of histories. Therefore, the solution found
in the previous subsection has to be generalized.
The first step is to characterize the properties of the dynamics of real
histories, which amounts to study randomly biased diffusion on De Bruijn
graphs. This gives a relationship between the strength of the biases and the
typical deviation δρµ = ρµ − 1/P from the uniform distribution they cause.
Then we move to the MG and quantify the bias which agents induce on the
dynamics of µ in the asymmetric phase. Using a simple parametrization of ρµ
which is inferred from numerical data, the calculus of the previous subsection
can be generalized to the real histories case. This leads to a self-consistent
equation between the asymmetry of the game and the diffusion bias, which
can be solved [39].
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Figure 2.16: De Bruijn graph of order 3
De Bruijn graphs
A history µ(t) can be encoded by a binary sequence of length M which
consists of M ordered elements {b(t −M), · · · , b(t − 1)} where b is a letter
belonging to the alphabet {0, 1}. The next history µ(t + 1) is obtained by
adding b(t) to the right of µ(t) and erasing b(t − M). Thus, for a given
µ(t), there are two possible µ(t + 1), which we call “next neighbours”. This
updating rule defines the De Bruijn graph [40] of order M (see Fig. 2.16 for
an example).
Let G be the P × P adjacency matrix of the De Bruijn graph of order
m. if we adopt the convention that its elements are labelled by the decimal
value of the binary strings, that is, µ = 0, · · · , P − 1,
Gµ,ν = δ[2µ%P ],ν + δ[2µ%P ]+1,ν (2.87)
where A%B stands for the remainder of the division of B by A and δi,j is
the Kronecker symbol. The adjacency matrix for M = 3 is :
G =


1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1


(2.88)
Unbiased diffusion
The unbiased diffusion is defined as follows : a particle moves on the directed
De Bruijn graph G and at each time step t, it jumps with equal probability to
one of the next neighbours of the vertex it stands on at this time. Thus the
transition probabilities matrix is W0 = G/2. In the long run, the fraction of
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time spent on vertex ν is given by [(W0)
∞]0,ν . It can be seen (see appendix)
that
[(W0)
k]µ,ν =
1
2k
2k−1∑
n=0
δ[2kµ%P ]+n,ν. (2.89)
In particular, (W M+k0 )µ,ν =
1
P
for all k ≥ 0, that is, all strings µ are visited
with the same frequency ρµ = 1/P .
In order to have a intuitive feeling of those graphs, we write them for
M = 3 :
W 20 =
1
4


1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1


W 30 =
1
8


1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1


(2.90)
Randomly biased diffusion
The perturbations are introduced by adding a term to the transition prob-
abilities matrix W = W0 + W1 where  quantifies the asymmetry and W1
contains the disorder ξ
(W1)µ,ν = (−1)νξµ(W0)µ,ν (2.91)
where the ξ are iid from the pdf P (ξ) = 1/2 δ(ξ − 1) + 1/2 δ(ξ + 1) and the
(−1)ν comes from the normalization of the perturbed probabilities. We are
looking for the stationary transition probabilities, i.e., W∞ such that W
∞
 =
limk→∞ (W)
k. It exists since W is a bounded operator. Its formal series
expansion in  is noted by W∞ =
∑
k≥0 
kW∞k where W
∞
0 is a matrix whose
all coefficients are equal to 1/P (see above). The relationship W∞ = W
∞
 W
provides the recurrence
W∞k = W
∞
k W0 + W
∞
k−1W1 (2.92)
Since W Mk W
∞
0 = 0, we iterate M − 1 times this equation by replacing W∞k
with W∞k W0 + W
∞
k−1W1 in the r.h.s., yielding to
W∞k = W
∞
k−1W1V = W
∞
0 [W1V ]
k , (2.93)
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Figure 2.17: Squared norms of ρ(k) for k=0,. . . ,4 (circles, squares, diamonds,
triangles up, full triangles)(average over 500 samples). They decrease as 1/P
for large P . The continuous lines are exact theoretical predictions.
where V =
∑M−1
c=0 (W0)
c. At this point, it is useful to remark that multiplying
a matrix on the left by W∞0 is equivalent to averaging its columns :
(W∞0 A)µ,ν =
P−1∑
a=0
(W∞0 )µ,aAa,ν =
1
P
P−1∑
a=0
Aa,ν = average of A’s ν-th column
(2.94)
thus the matrices W∞k consist of averages of columns of (W1V )
k. Therefore,
(W∞k )µ,ν is the k-th order correction to the frequency of vertex ν, that will
be called ρν(k) in the following. Note that 〈ρν(k)〉ξ = 0 for all k ≥ 1. The
square root of the second moment of ρν(k) averaged over the disorder gives
an indication of the typical value of ρν(k). In appendix 2.15.2 we obtain the
approximation
〈||ρ(k)||2〉ξ ∼ (1− 1/P )
k
P
. (2.95)
which is exact for the first order perturbation. Therefore ρν(k) is of the same
order as the unperturbed ρν(0), thus it cannot be neglected. Fig 2.17 shows
that the behavior predicted by Eq (2.95) is indeed correct for large P .
Finally, one can estimate the second moment of ρν. If one supposes that
the perturbations at different orders are independent, one obtains
∆ρ2 =
1
P
P−1∑
ν=0
[
〈[ρν]2〉ξ − 〈ρν〉2ξ
]
' 1
P 2
[
1
1− (1− 1/P )2 − 1
]
' 1
P 2
2
1− 2
(2.96)
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Figure 2.18: Comparison between the fluctuations of MG with uniformly
sampled (squares) and real histories (full circles). In the symmetric phase,
there are equal whereas they differ significantly in the asymmetric phase.
Dashed and continuous lines correspond to theoretical predictions ; they
overlap in the symmetric phase (M = 8, S = 2, 300P iterations, average
over 200 samples)
Application to MG
Before doing any analytic calculations, it is worth looking at Figures 2.18
and 2.19 which clearly show that Cavagna’s assertion is right as long as
the system is in the symmetric phase. Indeed, if 〈Aµ〉 = 0, the transition
probabilities from µ to its next neighbours are unbiased, that is µ = 0 ;
therefore in the symmetric phase, where 〈Aµ〉 = 0 for all µ, the frequencies
of visit are uniform ρµ = 1/P . Accordingly, numerical simulations show that
these quantities collapse on the same curve.
As α increases, the critical point is crossed, and 〈Aµ〉 6= 0 for some µ.
The dynamics of the history is biased on all such histories and consequently
all macroscopic quantities are significantly different : both σ2/N and H/N
are lower for real histories than for uniformly sampled histories. This can
be understood by the facts that σ2/N and H are increasing functions of α
and that the biases on the De Bruijn graph of histories reduce the effective
number of histories, that can be defined as 2−log2 ρ : in other words, effective
α of MG with real histories is smaller than that of MG with uniform histories.
This explanation is indeed confirmed by Fig 2.20 ; this shows the fraction
of frozen agents23 φ which is a decreasing function of α in the asymmetric
phase. As expected from the above argument, φ of MG with real histories is
23See [24] : they are agents that stop to be adaptive.
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Figure 2.19: Comparison between available information of MG with uni-
formly sampled (squares) and real histories (circles). Dashed and continuous
lines correspond to theoretical predictions (M = 8, S = 2, 300P iterations,
average over 200 samples)
larger than that of MG with uniformly sampled histories.
The bias µ on a particular history can be estimated for large N : in this
limit Aµ is a Gaussian variable with average 〈Aµ〉 and variance 〈(Aµ)2〉 −
〈Aµ〉2, leading to
µ = 〈sgn(Aµ)〉 ' µth = erf


√√√√ 〈Aµ〉2
2[〈(Aµ)2〉 − 〈Aµ〉2]

 . (2.97)
Fig 2.21 confirms the validity of Eq. (2.97). The figure also shows that
the µ are unevenly distributed : they are not equal even if the system is
deep in the asymmetric phase (α ' 8.5 in this figure). Indeed, as a function
of µ, 〈Aµ〉 is a random variable with average 0 and variance H which is an
increasing function of α. Since we studied diffusion of perturbed graphs with
only one parameter , we have to map all µ onto a scalar quantity, so that
we define  as the non weighted average24 of µ over the histories. For large
P ,  can be approximated by
¯th = 2
∫ ∞
0
dA
e−
A2
2H√
2piH
erf

 A√
2(σ2 −H)

 . (2.98)
24This is clearly an important assumption, but the diffusion on De Bruijn graphs with
one µ per site leads to a much greater complexity. As it appears on Fig 2.18, 2.19 and
2.24, this assumption is not unrealistic.
2.15. EXACT SOLUTION 63
0.1 1 10
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
φ
Figure 2.20: Comparison between the fraction of frozen agents in MG with
uniformly sampled (squares) and real histories (circles). In the symmetric
phase, there are equal whereas they differ significantly in the asymmetric
phase (M = 8, S = 2, 300P iterations, average over 200 samples)
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Figure 2.21: µth of Eq (2.97) vs real 
µ (M = 10, N = 121, S = 2, 1000P
iterations)
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Figure 2.22: Distribution of the frequency of visit of the histories in the
minority game. The continuous line is the best fit for a pdf given by Eq
(2.99) (M = 13, N = 801, S = 2, 400P iterations)
Here both H and σ2 are computed analytically by modifying the replica
calculus (see below). They depend however on the distribution ρµ. In order
to make Eq. (2.98) a self-consistent equation for ¯th, we need to parameterize
the distribution of ρµ by ¯th itself.
We could not find ab initio the analytic form of the pdf of {ρµ}, but Fig
2.22 shows that
P (τ) ' (λ + 1)
λ+1
Γ(λ + 1)
τλe−(λ+1)τ (2.99)
is a very good approximation for the pdf of ρ = τ/P . The parameter λ is
easily connected to ¯th :
〈τ 2〉 − 〈τ〉2 = 1
1 + λ
= P 2∆ρ2 ' ¯
2
th
1− ¯2th
(2.100)
where we used Eq. (10). This gives λ ' (1 − 2¯2th)/¯2th. Note that this
approximation requires ¯th < 1/
√
2.
This turns Eq. (2.98) into an equation for ¯th, and the theory is self
consistent. Figure 2.23 reports measured  and its approximation ¯th. What
clearly appears from this figure is that  is far from being negligible, and that
¯th is a quite good approximation to .
We can also check the validity of Eq. (2.96) against the self-consistent
theory. Fig 2.24 shows that Eq. (2.96) is in good agreement with numerical
simulations as long as all histories are visited. In addition the approximation
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Figure 2.23:  versus α = P/N (M = 7 and M = 9, S = 2, 300P iterations,
average over 200 samples). The straight line is ¯th, the theoretical prediction
of the self consistent theory.
¯th for  leads to qualitatively similar results, but underestimates ∆ρ
2 because
¯th <  (see figure 2.23).
The self-consistent replica calculation for the Minority Game of refs. [32,
34, 35] with the ansatz ρ = τ/P and τ given by the pdf (2.99) is discussed in
the appendix. Fig 2.18 and 2.19 indicate that analytic predictions are well
supported by numerical simulations.
In the asymmetric phase, which is arguably the most relevant and in-
teresting in the MG [35], all quantities of MG change significantly if one
replaces real histories with random uniform histories. A dependence on the
frequencies ρµ does not necessarily imply the relevance of the detailed dy-
namics of the histories. If the histories µ where drawn randomly from the
“correct” distribution ρµ, the results would be the same (actually it suffices
to know the pdf of ρµ). The problem is that the distribution ρµ depends on
the asymmetry 〈Aµ〉, which in turn depend on the microscopic constitution of
all agents [24]. In other words, ρµ is a self-consistently determined quantity
and hence it is only known a posteriori.
Therefore the dynamics of histories cannot be considered as irrelevant.
Indeed, even for the canonical MG, it is relevant and cannot be replaced by
randomly drawn histories. In addition, for many extensions and variations
of the MG, the dynamics of histories is not only relevant, but crucial (see
chapter 4).
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Figure 2.24: Inhomogeneity of the frequency of histories ∆ρ2 versus α = P/N
from : numerical simulations (full circles), Eq (2.96) with  from numerical
simulations (void squares) and Eq (2.96) with ¯th (continuous line) ; inset :
average number of visited histories versus α ; (M = 8, S = 2, 300P iterations,
average over 200 samples).
Appendix : (W k0 )µ,ν
Let us prove by induction that
(W k0 )µ,ν =
1
2k
2k−1∑
n=0
δ[2kµ%P ]+n,ν (2.101)
It is sufficient to calculate explicitly (W k0 )µ,ν from (W
k−1
0 )µ,ν
(W k0 )µ,ν =
P−1∑
τ=0
(W0)µ,τ (W
k−1
0 )τ,ν
=
2k−1−1∑
n=0
{
δ[2k−1([2µ%P ])%P ]+n,ν + δ[2k−1([2µ%P ]+1)%P ]+n,ν
}
=
1
2k
2k−1∑
n=0
δ[2kµ%P ]+n,ν (2.102)
since A(B%P )%P = AB%P and (2kµ + 2k−1)%P = [2kµ%P ] + 2k−1 if
P = 2M and k ≤ M − 1.
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Appendix : 〈||ρ(k)||2〉ξ
In order to simplify the notations, we define
(Xc)µ,ν =
2c−1∑
n=0
δ[2c+1µ%P ]+n,ν − δ[2c+1µ%P ]+n+2c,ν (2.103)
This matrix is such that
(Xc)µ,ν =


1 if 2c+1µ%P ≤ ν < [2c+1µ%P ] + 2c}
−1 if [2c+1µ%P ] + 2c ≤ ν < 2c+1(µ + 1)%P
0 else
(2.104)
With this formalism, one can write W1V as
(W1V )µ,ν =
ξµ
2
M−1∑
c=0
1
2c
(Xc)µ,ν (2.105)
Let us calculate the perturbation at order 1 : one has to compute ||ρ(1)||2
in order to obtain an estimation of the typical value of a generic ρν(1) : since
the ξ are uncorrelated and
∑P−1
ν=0 (X
c)µ,ν(X
d)µ,ν = 2
c+1δc,d ,
〈||ρ(1)||2〉ξ = 1
4P 2
P−1∑
µ,ν=0
M−1∑
c=0
[(Xc)µ,ν]
2
22c
=
(1− 1/P )
P
(2.106)
The next orders of perturbation are much harder to handle. However, for
large P , one can approximate them by supposing that
〈||ρ(k)||2〉ξ ∼ (1− 1/P )〈||ρ(k−1)||2〉ξ = (1− 1/P )
k
P
. (2.107)
Consequently, ρν(k) ∼ (1− 1/P )k/2 1P ' 1P at leading order
Appendix : replica calculus for real histories
The generalization of the calculus of previous subsection to ρµ = τµ/P drawn
from the pdf given by Eq (2.99) and (2.98) is straightforward ; the free energy
reads in the thermodynamic limit
f(β, Q, q, R, r) = 〈 α
2β
log[1 + χτ ]〉τ + 1 + q
2
〈 11
τ
+ χ
〉τ
+
αβ
2
(RQ− rq)− 1
β
〈log
∫ 1
−1
dse−β(ζs
2−√αr z s)〉z (2.108)
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where χ = β(Q− q)/α and ζ = −
√
α/r β(R− r). Next, the β →∞ limit is
taken while keeping finite χ and ζ. One obtains
Hc =
1 + Q
2
[
〈 11
τ
+ χ
〉τ − χ〈 1
[ 1
τ
+ χ]2
〉τ
]
(2.109)
and as previously,
σ2c = Hc +
1−Q
2
(2.110)
where Q and χ take their saddle point values, given by the solution of
Q(ζ) = 1−
√
2
pi
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
−
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
(2.111)
Q(ζ) =
1
α
[
erf (ζ/
√
2)
χζ
]2
1
〈 1
[1/τ+χ]2
〉τ − 1 (2.112)
χ〈 11
τ
+ χ
〉τ = erf (ζ/
√
2)
α
(2.113)
Eqs (2.112) and (2.113), together with Eq (2.98), form a closed set of equa-
tions that has to be solved numerically. Note that as in the random histories
case, χ becomes infinite at the critical point, where αc = erf (ζ/
√
2).
Chapter 3
Variations of MG
After having defined an extremely simple model, it is always tempting to
experiment variations of the model. There are two main goals : to test
which properties of the MG are robust under modifications, and to obtain
new results.
3.1 Payoff
The first modification we did (in first chapter) concerned the payoff. Origi-
nally, it was defined as G(x) = sgnx, but it turned out that a linear payoff
simplifies a lot all mathematical computations. Two questions are still open
at this point of the discussion :
• How do the properties of the system vary when the payoff is changed ?
• How far the mathematical formalism can be applied ? Is it possible to
find the exact solution for various payoffs ?
The first question has been partially answered in [43, 24, 47] : there
are no qualitative changes to the structure of the MG when the payoff is
changed. However, in the symmetric phase, depending on the payoff function,
the probability distribution function of A(t) is modified : for some payoff
functions, A(t) ∝ N ∀t, whereas A ∝ √N or N otherwise [22]. In addition,
in the asymmetric phase, the stationary state depends on the payoff function,
implying that also the macroscopic quantities vary. What remain is that the
structure of the game (phase transition) is conserved.
The fact that there is a phase transition implies that some quantity char-
acterizing the asymmetry of the game is minimized. As already discussed,
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the central equation in MGs is that of strategies score update. For a given
payoff function,
Ui,s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t)− aµi,sG[A(t)] (3.1)
The thermodynamic limit has then to be taken. The difficulty arise from the
rescaling of the payoff function, so for the moment being, assume that it is
properly rescaled and noted by GN(x) such that the proper time derivate is
defined
U˙ ci,s(τ) = − lim
δτ→0
limth
1
δτ
(τ+δτ)P−1∑
t=τP
a
µ(t)
i,s GN [A(t)] (3.2)
The condition on GN is that limth GN [A(t)] has to be defined for A(t) ∼
√
N .
There are several choices, depending on the choice of the payoff function.
For instance, if G(x) ∼ xγ , GN(x) = x/N (1+γ)/2. Up to now, no Lyapunov
function could be found for a general payoff function. Good candidates are
〈G(A)〉2 and G(〈A〉)2.
3.2 Evolution
In any competitive situation, there are winners and losers. In real life, it
is impossible to indefinitely lose, so that in principle, the worst performers
eventually disappear. As originally defined, the Minority Game does not
include an evolutionary process on the strategies, since agents’ strategies sets
are fixed during the game, and renewal is not allowed, for the sake of extreme
simplicity. A selection-evolution is a fundamental process in competitive
situations, therefore it is mandatory to implement evolution in the MG.
But, again, one has to design selection processes in the simplicity spirit
of MG, that is, without introducing several parameters.
3.2.1 Evolutionary strategies
Evolution in strategies is maybe the simplest evolutionary process. When an
agent switches to another strategy, it is because she feels that the one she
had been using is less rewarding that the one she will be using from now
on. A natural reaction is to discard, with some probability pev, the strategy
she has been using and to draw a completely new strategy. Note that with
this setup, an agent that has a good strategy does not evolve. Fig 3.1 shows
that this leads to a MG with very different properties. In particular, the
symmetric phase disappears, and agents are able to achieve a much better
degree of cooperation.
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Figure 3.1: σ2/N (circles), H/N (squares) and φ (stars) versus α for MG
with evolutionary strategies (pev = 0.1, M = 8, S = 2, 400P iterations,
average over 100 samples). There is neither a phase transition, nor herding
effect.
3.2.2 Darwinism
The previous evolution permits agents to self-modify. However, in real life,
worst agents do disappear. The following Darwinism process is studied in
[20, 22] : every τ time steps, the worst player is replaced by a clone of the
best, except that one strategy of the clone is redrawn with a small probability
p in order to allow regeneration, and that the virtual gains of the strategies
are reset to zero, like a new born baby. If the new player is a pure clone of the
best one, one says that both belong to the same species. A demonstration
of the Darwinism’s benefits can be seen in figure 3.2 : the latter shows a
comparison between the variance of the attendance signal with and without
Darwinism. The region where σ2/N < 1 is much greater when evolution takes
place, in particular the α < αc region is less affected by the overcrowding.
Note that increasing p lowers σ2/N , that is, the mutations are useful. The
asymptotic behaviors of σ2/N in the α → ∞ limit depends on p, but the
Darwinism is anyway harmful in this region. One also sees that the minimum
of σ2/N is not at the same α than without Darwinism.
Since p < 1, the diversity (the number of different species) is reduced by
the evolutionary process, and tends to a value that depends on p. When p
decreases, the diversity decreases too, but stays over N/2 even if p = 0. Even
more, when one starts with only one species, but with random virtual gains,
the system performs first very badly, slowly improves itself, and reaches an
optimal diversity always greater than N/2. When the diversity is stable,
72 CHAPTER 3. VARIATIONS OF MG
0.1 1 10
α
0.1
1
10
σ
2 /N
Figure 3.2: Dependence of σ2/N in ρ with Darwinism for p = 0.01 (stars)
and p = 0.1 (squares) (M = 5, S = 2, τ = 10, average over 50 samples).
The dashed line represents the random performance and the continuous line
is σ2/N without Darwinism.
the system is in a stationary state, and one can study several distributions.
First, figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the species life time. It is a power
law with exponent −2.02 ± 0.02, which does not depend on the parameters
(τ , p, ...). Fortunately, it is the same exponent as found in real life evolution
[56]). Figure 3.4 helps to understand what happens. The average gain of
several players during the game is plotted. One can see players remaining
in the game, some other resisting for a while, then disappearing. The player
that replaces a dead one is followed. This figure shows that the fluctuations
of the average gain is very high when a player is young. Consequently such
a player’s death or reproduction are more likely than those of an old player ;
this leads to punctuated equilibrium, which may be the origin of the power
law distribution.
After sufficient time, it is interesting to rank the species according to the
size of their population, and to Zipf plot the number of members composing
each species against their rank (see figure 3.5). One finds a power law that
depends at least on p ; indeed, if p = 1, the best performer will never be
completely cloned and one obtains a flat line : every type of player has only
one member.
In order to test the Darwinian process, we tried to apply the inverse
process : a clone of the worse player replaces the best one. The figure 3.6
shows that the global performance suffers a lot.
One can wonder why the coordination is better in the crowded phase
although there are multiple clones of a lot of players. This is not really
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of species life time (N=101, M=8, S=2, NIT=500000,
τ=10). The straight line has a -2 exponent.
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Figure 3.4: Temporal evolution of the average gain of several players (N = 51,
M = 10, S = 2, τ=10). Note the consequences of the death of a player at
t=1450 and t=2100.
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Figure 3.5: Rank of the members in a type of player (N = 20001, S = 5,
M = 5, τ = 10). It is a power-law, but the exponent depends on the system’s
parameters.
understood. In the asymmetric phase, the worst agent is very likely to be
non frozen, and the best agent is either very young, or frozen. Cloning a
frozen agent means that H is lowered, and accordingly σ2. The fact that the
fluctuations are minimal at a higher α is consistent with this explanation :
indeed, less agents are needed to cancel H. On the other hand, the fluctu-
ations are also reduced in the symmetric phase, probably because the score
of the freshers are set to zero : it is consequently more difficult for agents to
coordinate, reducing accordingly the fluctuations.
Finally, note that the Darwinian processes described above is not the only
one that has been studied in a MG (see ref. [57]), but they are thoses with
the least parameters.
3.3 Local or personal information
In the standard MG, a common piece of history — random or real — is
given to all agents. Some authors considered cases where agents do not
share the same piece of information : they have rather their own one, µi(t).
For instance, µi(t) can encode the M last previous actions of agent i [48] ;
agents still play a global MG ; the control parameter is
√
P/N in this case.
In addition, some authors studied other variants where µi(t) encodes the
previous choice of M neighbours (local information) and agents play a global
MG ([49] for random neighbours, [50] for agents on a circle). Finally, agents
are placed on a regular lattice, play a local MG (there are as many MG as
agents), and the local piece of information encode the last M minority choice
of the local MG [51] ; in this case, there is no more frustration, that this, no
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Figure 3.6: Anti Darwinism : a clone of the worst player replaces the best.
The attendance at side A is plotted with dots.
more competition.
In ref. [49] it is claimed (but not showed) that the major cause of co-
operation is the fact that all agents share the same piece of information.
This happens to be wrong, as shown for instance by ref. [50]. The point
is rather that agents cannot cooperate if the pieces of information agents
receive are not correlated [48]. In all the cases reviewed above, the histories
are — sometimes subtly — correlated. This is because they live in correlated
environments. For instance, consider the following case : µi(t) encodes the
last M successes or failures of agents i (1 = success, 0 = failure). Coopera-
tion still arises, as illustrated by figure 3.7, but is less and less pronounced as
M is increased, because the correlation is hard to attain for large M . Note
that herding effects also take place (as in Refs. [50, 48]), showing that a
phase transition occurs even in MGs with local or personal histories. This
is a consequence of the very behavior of agents, and is a general feature of
competition model with such agents [41].
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Figure 3.7: φ and σ2/N versus α for agents playing a global MG and whose
personal histories reflect their gain/losses, for M = 2 (circles), M = 3
(squares) and M = 4 (stars). (300P iterations, average over 100 samples).
Chapter 4
From less naive
to sophisticated agents
In this chapter, the perception that agents have of the success of their strate-
gies is shown to play a crucial role on the Lyapunov function, thus all the
properties of the system.
Agents as originally defined are naive in the sense that they do not account
for their impact on the game. Indeed the strategies’ scores are updated (Eq.
(2.5)) as if the outcome A(t) did not depend on their action. In other words,
agents behave as if their were facing an external process. This is justified if
agents do not even know that they belong to the game, and that the latter is
a minority game. On the contrary, if they are aware of the fact that they have
an impact, they will be willing to modify their behavior, that is, the way they
reward their strategies. The key observation is that they overestimate their
non played strategies with respect to that they are playing. The question is :
by how much.
4.1 Partial information
Suppose that agents only know that they have an impact1, but that they
have no mean to estimate it. They can arbitrarily decide that their impact is
η ; in other words, they can compensate the overestimation of the strategies
they do not play by adding a supplementary reward η to the strategy there
are playing. Eq (2.5) becomes [35]
Ui.s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t)− aµ(t)i,s Aµ(t)(t)/P + ηδs,si(t)/P. (4.1)
1this is already a very important information
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After some easy algebra, one obtains the new dynamics of the probabilities
pii,s :
dpii,s
dτ
= −Γipii,s


∑
j
[
ai,s〈aj〉 − 〈ai〉〈aj〉
]
− η(pii,s − |pii|2)

 (4.2)
and the Lyapunov function for this dynamics :
Hη = H − η
∑
i
|pii|2 = H − ηQ (4.3)
where Q =
∑
i |pii|2. Indeed, observing that
∂Hη
∂pii,s
= −2dUi,s
dτ
and using Eq. (2.34), one finds that
dHη
dτ
=
∑
i
∂Hη
∂~pii
· d~pii
dτ
= −2∑
i
Γi
S∑
s=1
pii,s

dUi,s
dτ
− ~pii · d
~Ui
dτ


2
< 0. (4.4)
The dynamics converges therefore to the minima of Hη. It is very inter-
esting to study the effects of η on the system’s behavior. For η  1, as long
as H  η, that is, in the asymmetric phase, reasonably far from the critical
point, the properties of the modified MG are the same as that of the standard
MG. Near the critical point, H ∼ (α − αc)2, therefore, for α ∼ αc(1 +√η),
both terms in Hη are equally important. Consequently, H 6= 0 for all α :
there is no phase transition for η > 0. The symmetric phase completely dis-
appears, and H/N , σ2/N → 0 in the α → 0 limit : the system is arbitrage
free (efficient) (H = 0) and Pareto efficient (σ2/N = 0) in this limit.
Fig. 4.1 illustrates the spectacular effects of even a small η : σ2/N does
no more display a herding behavior, while H/N seems to be quite the same
with and without η ; note that there is no phase transition, and H does not
vanish, since the fraction of frozen agents tends to 1 when α decreases.
The detailed agents’ behavior is also changed. One can redo the discussion
of section 2.14 in order to include the η effect. One can show that individual
payoffs increase when η increases in [0, 1], which is consistent with the fact
that σ2 decreases. The case η < 1 is treated first. In the long run the
perceived performance of strategy s is
〈∆Us〉 = −as〈A−i〉 − ~pi · ~aas + ηpis
∼= −as〈A−i〉 − (1− η)pis (4.5)
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Figure 4.1: φ, σ2/N and H/N for η = 0 (void symbols) and η = 0.1 (full
symbols) (P = 100, 300P iterations, average over 100 samples).
where, again, the approximation in Eq. (4.5) holds for P  1. The average
score increase of the played strategies is now.
v = − 1
n
n∑
s=1
as〈A−i〉 − 1− η
n
Then Eq. (4.5) becomes
pis =
1
n
+
1
1− η
(
1
n
n∑
s′=1
as′〈A−i〉 − as〈A−i〉
)
.
The average payoff g = −~pi · ~a〈A−i〉 − 1 delivered by a learning behavior
with parameter η is
g = − 1
n
n∑
s=1
as〈A−i〉+ 1
1− η
n∑
s=1
(
as〈A−i〉 − 1
n
n∑
s′=1
as′〈A−i〉
)2
− 1 (4.6)
which is an increasing function of η for η < 1. Indeed at fixed n, this is
trivially true. With some more algebra, it is easy to check that n is a non-
increasing function of η and that g increases as n decreases. This means that
for η < 1 average payoffs are non-decreasing functions of η as claimed.
When η → 1 the only possible solution is that with n = 1 which means
that the agent plays her best response to A−i. For η > 1 the agent over-
weights the performance of her strategies. As a result she sticks to only one
of her strategies, i.e. n = 1, but that need not be her best one. Without
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Figure 4.2: Fraction of frozen agents and normalized fluctuations versus α
for η ranging from 0.2 to 1 (P = 100, S = 2, 300P iterations, average over
100 samples).
entering in too many details, let us only mention that for η > 1 the agent
plays always one strategy which is dynamically selected by initial conditions
and stochastic fluctuations.
We expect that with η = 1 agents behave almost optimally, in the sense
that they converge to a stationary state which is close to a Nash equilibrium.
Given the difference in the collective behavior of agents in the two cases –
which may be appreciated comparing figure 2.1 for η = 0 with figure 4.5 for
η = 1 – it is natural to ask what happens when η changes continuously from
0 to 1.
Fig. 4.2 illustrate the behavior of φ and σ2/N for various η. As η increases
from 0 to 1, φ increases and for η = 1, all agents are frozen ; this is consistent
with the discussion above. Note that σ2/N seems to first slightly decrease
when η increases, and then to increase, specially for small α. This is maybe
due to very long time needed to reach equilibrium, thus, to too small simula-
tion times. Figure 4.3 shows the analytical predictions for the dependence on
η of σ2/N for S = 2. These are based on the replica symmetric ansatz which is
only valid for α > αRSB(η), where αRSB(η) marks a replica symmetry breaking
phase transition, which will be discussed elsewhere in detail[61]. Here we just
mention that αRSB(η) = 0 for η < 0, αRSB(0) = αc and αRSB(η) ≥ 1−1/
√
piα
(for S = 2 and) η > 0). For α < αRSB(η) the analytical results derived in
the appendix 8.2 provides an approximate description of the behavior of the
system which is however sufficient to appreciate the relevant features.
The most striking consequence of the result in fig. 4.3 is that the behavior
of σ2/N is quite different for α > αc and for α < αc. Indeed for large α,
σ2/N changes continuously with η whereas σ2/N drops discontinuously to
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Figure 4.3: Theoretical estimate of global efficiency σ2/N as a function of α
for S = 2 and several values of η within the replica symmetric ansatz.
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Figure 4.4: σ2/N as a function of η for S = 2 and α ' 0.079 < αc ' 0.3374
and α ' 0.63 > αc. Results both of numerical simulations of the minority
game and of the numerical minimization of Hη are shown.
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zero as η → 0 for small α. This feature is reproduced in figure 4.4 for two
characteristic values of α also shown as arrows in fig. 4.3. We show both the
behavior derived from the numerical minimization of Hη and the behavior of
the modified minority game with rewarding. Numerical results agree quite
well in an intermediate range of values of η whereas for η > 0.5 or η < −0.2
some discrepancy – which we believe is due to finite size effects – is found.
This effect can be even more spectacular when anti-persistence effects occur.
Indeed the jump of σ2/N at η = 0 can be of several orders of magnitude !
The origin of this behavior lies in the dynamic degeneracy of the system
for α < αc and η = 0. Even an infinitesimal change in η can dramatically
alter the nature of the minima of Hη : for negative η there is only one
minimum which becomes shallower and shallower as η → 0−. At η = 0
the minimum is always unique but it is no more point-like. Rather it is a
connected set M. An infinitesimal positive value of η is enough to lift this
degeneracy and select only some extreme points of M as the minima of Hη.
The set of minima becomes suddenly disconnected. At fixed α < αc, varying
η across the transition Hη changes continuously – with a discontinuity in its
first derivative – whereas G and hence σ2/N change discontinuously with a
jump.
The potential implications of this result are quite striking : rewarding
the strategy played more than those which have not been played by a small
amount is always advantageous, both individually (see below) and globally. In
particular, an infinitesimal reward is sufficient to avoid crowd effects when
α is small and to reduce the fluctuations by a finite amount.
4.2 Full information
In the previous section, agents were able to account for their impact on
the game, and did not know it exactly, because they only had a partial
information.
The real question to be answered is “What would have been the outcome
if I had played another strategy”. This requires the knowledge of A(t), that
is, agents need to have access to full information. In this case, agents can
update their strategies score according to [35]
Ui,s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t)− aµ(t)i,s (A(t)− aµ(t)i,si(t) + a
µ(t)
i,s ) (4.7)
or, with the notation A−i(t) =
∑
j 6=i a
µ(t)
j,sj(t)
,
Ui,s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t)− aµ(t)i,s Aµ(t)−i (t)− 1 (4.8)
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This equation suggests that, in first approximation we can regard the oppo-
nents of i as an external stationary stochastic process. It is known [42] that
exponential learning with full information, for a single agent playing against
a stationary stochastic process, converges to rational expectations, that is,
he ends up using the strategy a deduction process would have selected. If
this happens for all players the system converges to a Nash equilibrium. This
is indeed what numerical experiments show (see figure 4.5).
The transformation to continuous time is exactly the same as previously,
and Eq. (2.34) becomes
dpii,s
dτ
= −Γipii,s
∑
j, j 6=i
[
ai,s〈aj〉 − 〈ai〉〈aj〉
]
. (4.9)
Since the dynamics changed, the global quantity that agents minimize is
different. In this case, the fluctuations σ2 =
∑
i,j 6=i (~pii · ~ai)(~pij · ~aj) + N are a
Lyapunov function under this dynamics. Indeed a little algebra leads to
dσ2
dt
= −2∑
i
S∑
s=1
pii,s

(ai,s − ~pii · ~ai)∑
j 6=i
~pij · ~aj


2
≤ 0. (4.10)
But the fluctuations are exactly equal to the total losses of agents. There-
fore, Eq (4.10) implies that agents minimize their losses under this learning
dynamics. In terms of Evolutionary Game theory, this means that they reach
a Nash equilibrium. This is confirmed by the direct application of the multi-
population standard replicator dynamics [17] (RD) which is known to lead
to a Nash equilibrium and reads
dpii,s
dt
= −pii,s
∑
j, j 6=i
[
ai,s(~pij · ~aj)− (~pii · ~ai)(~pij · ~aj)
]
. (4.11)
Apart from the factor Γi, this coincides with the RD of Eq. (4.11). Again
σ2 is minimized along the trajectories of Eq. (4.9) : it is easy to check
that the time derivative of σ2 is given by Eq. (4.10) with an extra factor Γi
inside the sum on i. We therefore conclude that with exponential learning
and full information agents coordinate on a Nash equilibrium. Therefore
Nash equilibria are local minima of σ2 in ∆N . Furthermore, σ2 is a linear
function of pii,s for any i, s, so that
∂2σ2
∂pi2i,s
= 0, ∀i, s. Therefore σ2 is an
harmonic function in ∆N which implies that the minima are on the boundary
of ∆N . This holds for any subset of variables pii,s which therefore implies that
minima are located in the corners of the simplex, i.e. Nash equilibria are in
pure strategies (G = 1). This, in its turn, implies that Nash equilibria have
σ2 ≈ H by Eq. (2.33).
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Figure 4.5: Global efficiency σ2/N as a function of α for S = 2, 3, and 4
from numerical simulations with P = 128 averaged over 100 realizations of
~ai (symbols) and from the theoretical lower bound (lines).
Note that the Nash equilibrium to which agents converge depends on the
initial conditions Ui,s(0), i.e. on prior beliefs : Different initial conditions
select different Nash equilibria
A detailed analytical characterization of these Nash equilibria is given
elsewhere [61]. Here we briefly mention that also in this case Nash equilibria
are exponentially many in N . This makes the analytic calculation a step
more difficult than the one we shall present later. A simplified approximate
calculation (see appendix) gives the following lower bound2 :
σ2
N
≥


[
1− z(S)√
α
]2
for α > z(S)2
0 for α ≤ z(S)2 (4.12)
where α = P/N and z(S) =
√
2/piS
∫∞
−∞dz e
−z2z[1 − erfc(z)/2]S−1 is the
expected value of the maximum among S standard random variable (for
S  1, z(S) ' √2 lnS).
Figure 4.5 shows that the lower bound is already a good approximation to
the typical value of σ2 in the Nash equilibrium, specially for small values of S.
Eq. (4.12) implies that, for fixed S, σ2 increases with α, which is reasonable
because the complexity of information increases and the resources of agents is
limited by S. For fixed α, Eq. (4.12) suggests that σ2 decreases with S. So if
agents are given more resources (larger S), they attain a better equilibrium.
Both of these features are confirmed by numerical simulations (see fig. 4.5).
2Strictly speaking, the meaning of this lower bound is that the probability to observe
σ2 smaller than the lower bound decreases exponentially with N
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It is worth to point out that the game specified by the payoffs of Eq. (4.7),
for N and P very large, implies a fantastic computational complexity. De-
ductive rational agents should be able to master a chain of logical deductions
of formidable complexity in order to derive their best response. The efforts
required by this strategic situation may well exceed the bounds of memory
and computational capabilities of any realistic agent or more simply the re-
sources she is likely to devote to the problem. Furthermore her assumption
that everybody else behaves as a rational deductive player becomes more
and more unrealistic as N grows large. Finally, even with deductive rational
agents there would still be the problem of equilibrium selection which, in this
case, involves a huge number of possible equilibria.
Note that the class of Nash equilibria discussed above are not the only
Nash equilibria that exist in this kind of problem. Generally, Nash equilibria
are defined with respect to all strategies of all agents. If the nature of strate-
gies changes, then other kind of Nash equilibria appears (see refs [35, 36] for
more details).
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Chapter 5
Modeling market mechanisms
Although in principe the MG can be considered as a model for understanding
competition between adaptative agents, its most popular interpretation con-
cerns the financial markets. Most authors do not explicit the relationships
between the MG and real markets, or only say that the MG is a metaphor-
ical model which gives only access to stylized facts. Actually, even if the
MG does not include some very important ingredients of financial markets,
it is possible to extend it in order to include them. But the MG is really
connected with real financial markets because of the minority mechanism.
Indeed, it entails that it is not possible to make money by selling and buying
at the same time, or in the MG context, that two agents earn a positive gain
by forming a coalition.
The market interpretation of the MG consists of mapping the two possible
actions to “buy one share” (aµ = +1) and “sell one share” (aµ = −1). Agents
behave as price takers, that is, they buy or sell at the best available price.
But at a given time t, A(t) is always non zero, by definition of the MG. This
is called excess demand/offer and changes the price. In first approximation,
the agents buy or sell share to people that have placed sell or buy orders, that
is, they “eat” some part of the distribution of bid/ask (see Fig. 1.1), which
changes the price. For flat distributions and no spread, naively1 the price
variation is δp(t) ∝ A(t) 2, explaining how the MG in general and specially
the linear payoff function are related to financial markets.
Consequently, even the basic minority game can be used for exploring
the consequences of the minority mechanism. In particular, it allows to ask
simple question and to obtain simple answers, some of them being supported
by exact analytical results [34].
1In reality, if A(t) is large, the market maker dilutes the order in time, leading to a
smaller market impact [9].
2This approximation is found in [63, 4, 64] and holds for small A.
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5.1 Speculators with diversified strategies
In the standard MG, it is assumed that the agents draw all their strategies
randomly, and independently. One can argue that the agents can be less
simple-minded so that they first draw a strategy, and then following their
needs or what seems the best for them, draw the others strategies. For
instance, if S = 2, an agent can believe that one strategy is enough and
sticks to it (or takes two same strategies). Reversely, an agent might believe
that it is better to have one strategy and the opposite one. More generally,
we suppose that all the agents3 draw their second strategy according to
P (aµ↑ = a
µ
↓) = c ∀µ. (5.1)
The parameter c counts the average fraction of histories for which the
agents’ choices are biased, that is, the average correlation between their two
strategies. The standard MG corresponds to the independent case c = 1/2,
while having only one strategy is obtained with c = 1. The other very
special case is c = 0 : all agents have two opposite strategies, thus there
is no asymmetry in the outcome. As a result, the game is always in the
symmetric phase : as α is varied, no phase transition occurs (see section
2.13). Increasing c has two effects : on one hand it increases the bias of
the outcome Ωµ ∼ √cN , on the other hand it reduces the ability of the
agents of being adaptive, since they learn something about the game only
when ξµi 6= 0, which happens on average for (1− c)P histories. The fact that
the biases depend on c too implies that the second order phase transition
also occurs when this parameter is varied. With the replica formalism (see
appendix 5.7), one gets the phase diagram of the MG with parameter c (see
figure 5.1). In the standard MG, one varies α (dot-dashed vertical line). If
one fixes α and changes c, the symmetry is also broken (any horizontal line).
Note that if c = 0 and α > 1, an infinitesimal c breaks the symmetry of the
game.
5.2 Speculators and producers
Real markets are not zero sum games [9]. The fact that most participants are
interested in playing is beyond doubt. In real markets the participants can
be grossly divided into two groups : Speculators and Producers [44, 45, 9].
Producers can be characterized by those using the market for purposes other
3This can be generalized to a c for each agent ; exact results also arise from the replica
calculus
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Figure 5.1: Phase diagram of the Minority Game with diversified strategies.
The phase transition in the standard MG corresponds to the dash-dotted
vertical line c = 1/2. The circle are numerical data
than speculation. They need market for hedging, financing, or any ordinary
business, paying less or no attention to “timing the market”. Speculators,
on the other hand, join the market with the aim of exploiting the marginal
profit pockets. The two groups were shown to live in symbiosis [9] : the
former inject information into the market prices, and the latter make a living
carefully exploiting this information. One may wonder why do producers let
themselves be taken advantage of. One answer is that they have other,
probably more profitable business in mind. To conduct their business, they
need the market, and their expertise and talents in other areas give them
still better games to play. Speculators, being less capable in other areas, or
by choice, make do exploiting the ”meager margin” left in the competitive
market.
In the MG, these general questions can be studied in detail. Producers
will be limited in choice, their activities outside the game are not represented.
We define a speculator as an normal agent, and a producer as an
agent limited to one strategy. The latter have a fixed pattern in their market
behavior and put a measurable amount of information into the market, which
is exploited by the speculators. We take a population of N speculators and
always define α = P/N . We add ρN heterogeneous producers, so that ρ is
the fraction of producers per speculator. The outcome is then
Aµ = Aµspec + A
µ
prod. (5.2)
The bias induced by the producers adds to the one caused by the spec-
ulators, so that the total bias is of order
√
(c + ρ/2)N . Therefore the phase
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Figure 5.2: Gain of producers and speculators versus the number of producers
(in P unit) ; the number of speculators is fixed at N = 641 (c = 0, M = 8,
S = 2, α = 0.4, average over 200 realizations). The lines are theoretical
predictions.
transition can be obtained at fixed P by varying either N , c, or the number
of producers. Let us begin with the last possibility. We fix c = 0, P = 28,
N = 641 and plot the gains of the speculators and producers as a function of
the number of producers (see figure 5.2). In the symmetric phase, the specu-
lators wash out all available information, thus, by symmetry, the gain of the
producers (squares) is zero. As the number of producers increases, the gain
of the speculators (circles) stays negative but grows monotonically, while the
gain of the producers remains zero as long as the symmetry of the outcome
is not broken. When the number of producers reaches a critical value, the
speculators are no more able to remove all available information, therefore
the (second order) phase transition occurs (dashed line). Beyond this point,
the producers lose more and more, while some (frozen) speculators gain more
than zero on average (see 2.14.1). At one point, the gains of speculators and
producers are the same. Finally, there are enough producers to make the
gain of the speculators positive on average.
As illustrated by figures 5.3 and 5.4, if the number of speculators changes
the behavior is qualitatively the inverse of the one of figure 5.2 : The gain
of producers increases as the number of producers grows ; similarly, the gain
of the speculators decreases when N increases for sufficiently large N . If
there are not enough producers, the game is always negative sum for the
speculators, and their gain has a maximum (see figure 5.3).
We now expose exact analytical results concerning the gain of the two
types of agents. They rely on the generalization of the approach of refs.
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Figure 5.3: Gain of producers and speculators versus the number of specula-
tors (in P unit) ; the number of producers is fixed at 64 (c = 0, M = 8, S = 2,
average over 200 realizations). The lines lines are theoretical predictions.
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Figure 5.4: Gain of producers and speculators versus the number of specu-
lators (in P unit) ; the number of producers is fixed at 256 (c = 0, M = 6,
S = 2, average over 200 realizations). The lines are theoretical predictions.
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[32, 35] : the calculus is carried out in detail in appendix 5.7. Let us introduce
Gspec, the total gain of the speculators and Gprod, the one of the producers.
Since σ2 is equal to the total losses,
Gspec + Gprod = −σ2. (5.3)
The results depend on the ratio ρ between the number of producers, on
the number of speculators and on c, the parameter introduced in the previous
section. We obtain
σ2
N
=
c + ρ + (1− c)Q
(1 + χ)2
+ (1− c)(1−Q) (5.4)
where χ and Q take their saddle point values.. These two quantities depend
on α and on (1+ρ)/(1−c) (see appendix 5.7). The average gain per producer
is
Gprod
ρN
= − 1
1 + χ
(5.5)
and the average gain per speculator is
Gspec
N
= −c + ρ + (1− c)Q
(1 + χ)2
− (1− c)(1−Q) + ρ
1 + χ
. (5.6)
Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 completely agree with analytical results ; note
that the small deviations are finite size effects.
The fact that the gains of producers and speculators only depend on the
ratio ρ and not on how many producers and speculators there are in the game
explains why figures 5.3 and 5.4 look very much like the inverse of figure 5.2.
As it emerges for the replica calculus, the critical point αc only depends
4
on (1+ρ)/(1−c) (see figure 5.5), that is, on the distribution of the quenched
disorder. Numerical data (circles) completely agree with our results. The
vertical line corresponds to the standard MG (ρ = 0 and c = 1/2). A more
intuitive version of this phase diagram is shown in figure 5.6 for c = 0.
The game becomes favorable, on average, for the speculators when their
average gain is greater than zero. Using Eq (5.6), one can plot the curve
of zero sum gain for the speculators (see figure 5.6). One can see that the
number of producers must be greater than 1.868 . . . P (this value depends
on c) in order to make the game positive sum for the speculators ; this is
consistent with numerical simulations (figures 5.3 and 5.4).
4This explain why evolutionary schemes that preserve the distribution of the quenched
disorder have the same αc [57], while others that involve Darwinism, shift αc [20, 22].
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Figure 5.6: Phase diagram, and zero sum gain for speculators with c = 0
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The main message of these results is that producers always benefit from
the presence of speculators, and reversely : both types of agents live in sym-
biosis. Indeed, the producers introduce systematic biases into the market,
and without speculators, their losses would be proportional to theses biases.
The speculators precisely try to remove this kind of bias, reducing also sys-
tematic fluctuations in the market, thus reducing the losses of the producers
and their own losses. Moreover, the efforts of speculators yield a positive
gain only if the number of producers is sufficiently large. In this respect the
symmetric phase, where producers do not lose and speculators lose a lot, is
unrealistic : real speculators would rather withdraw from a market which is
in this phase, thus increasing α, and recovering the asymmetric phase5. This
suggests that a grand-canonical MG is much more realistic 6. Here we briefly
present an over-simplified “grand-canonical” MG. An agent enters into the
market only when she has a strategy with virtual points greater than zero.
As a result, the game is always in the asymmetric phase, but almost at the
transition point : the average losses of the producers are always extremely
small (see figure 5.7). When the number of producers increases, the a priori
asymmetry of the outcome increases, and more and more agents actually
play the game (see figure 5.8), thus in this situation, the producers give in-
centives to play to the speculators. Accordingly, the average gain of the
speculators, when positive, is higher in this grand-canonical MG than in the
corresponding canonical MG.
5.3 Speculators, producers and noise traders
The debate about what the noise traders do to a competitive market is not
closed [59]. In the economics literature a noise trader is not very precisely
defined. Sometimes they are synonym with speculators. We define noise
traders in the following way : they choose their actions without any basis.
Compared with speculators, who analyze carefully the market information,
noise traders take action in a purely random way (see appendix 5.7). Noise
traders may be speculators who base their action on astrology, on “fengshui”,
or on some “random number generators”. The model allows us to evaluate
the influence of noise traders on the market. They increase the market volatil-
ity σ2, as shown in Fig. 5.9 and in appendix 5.7. Therefore, in principle,
they do harm to themselves as well to other participants. Actually in the
linear–payoff version that we consider, the average gain of speculators and
producers is not much affected by noise traders, since 〈Anoise〉 = 0. However,
5Or accouting for their impact on the game with a η−modified dynamics
6See also [58]. This kind of grand-canonical MG can be exactly solved [54]
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Figure 5.7: Average gain per agent versus the number of producers (in P
units) in the grand canonical MG (N = 107, M = 5, α = 0.3, S = 2,
c = 1/2, average over 500 realizations)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Number of producers [P]
70
75
80
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f s
pe
cu
la
to
rs
 in
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t
Figure 5.8: Average number of speculators versus the number of producers
(in P units) in the grand canonical MG (N = 107, M = 5, α = 0.3, S = 2,
c = 1/2, average over 500 realizations, )
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Figure 5.9: Normalized variance of the outcome with (opaque circles and
without (black squares) noise traders ; the dotted line is the naive theoret-
ical prediction (N = 101 speculators, 50 noise traders, average over 1000
realizations).
it is easy to see that in the original version, where gi(t) = −ai(t)sgnA(t),
payoffs are reduced by the presence of noise traders [34].
Our numerical results of Fig. 5.9 also shows that deep in the symmetric
phase, noise traders reduces the volatility per agent σ2/(N+Nnoise), when this
becomes bigger than one. This is easy to understand assuming that the only
effect of noise traders is to increase σ2 by a constant equal to Nnoise ≡ ηN .
Let σ20/N be the volatility per agent, without noise traders (η = 0) and
σ2η that with noise traders. The variation in the volatility per agent in the
presence of noise traders is :
σ2η
N(1 + η)
− σ
2
0
N
' σ
2
0 + ηN
N(1 + η)
− σ
2
0
N
=
1− σ20/N
1 + 1/η
. (5.7)
As illustrated by figure 5.9, numerical simulations globally confirm these
conclusions, but also show that the effects of the noise traders are more
pronounced than the theory predicts.
5.4 Market impact
In order to quantify the impact of an agent on the market let us first consider
the case of an external agent with S strategies : This agent does not take
part in the game but just observes it from the outside. From this position,
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each of her strategies gives an average7 virtual gain
us = −as〈A〉, s = 1, . . . , S. (5.8)
Given that the strategies aµs are drawn randomly, us are independent random
variables. Since us is the sum of P  1 independent variables aµs 〈Aµ〉/P ,
their distribution is Gaussian with zero mean and variance
Var(us) =
1
P 2
P∑
µ=1
Var(aµs )〈Aµ〉2 =
H
P
.
Clearly, one of these strategies, that with us∗ = maxs us, is superior to all
others8. It would be most reasonable for this agent to just stick to this
strategy.
However, the same agent inside the game will typically use not only strat-
egy s∗. This is because every strategy, when used, delivers a real gain which is
reduced with respect to the virtual one by the “market impact”. Imagine the
“experiment” of injecting the new agent in a MG. Then 〈Aµ〉 → 〈Aµ〉 + aµs ,
where, in a first approximation, we neglect the reaction of other agents to
the new-comer. Then the real gain of the newcomer is :
gs ∼= −as〈A〉 − 〈as as〉 = us − 1. (5.9)
The agent will then update the scores Us(t) with the real gain gs for
the strategy she uses and with the virtual one us′ = gs′ + 1 − asas′ , for
the strategies she does not use (in the following, we neglect the term asas′).
Therefore inductive agents over-estimate the performance of the strategies
they do not play. Then if strategy s is played with a frequency ps, the
virtual score increases on average by
δUs = Us(t + 1)− Us(t) = psgs + (1− ps)(gs + 1)
= gs − ps + 1 (5.10)
at each time step (on average). Instead of playing only his best strategy, this
agent will end up playing n strategies. This is a consequence of the fact that
she neglects her impact on the market.
So far we did not take into account the reaction of other agents to the new-
comer. In order to quantify this effect, let us consider a MG in the asymmetric
phase, and let us add a new agent with the best strategy aµ = −sgn〈Aµ〉.
7The average is meant over a long time here
8The distribution of us∗ can be easily computed using extreme statistics. For S  1
typically us∗ '
√
2H log(S)/P .
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Figure 5.10: Ratio of real H ′ over approximated H ′ ' H − 2|〈A〉|+ 1 versus
α (N = 101, average over 100 realizations)
This gives us an idea of this effect in the extreme case and we expect that for
a randomly drawn strategy the effect will be smaller. Neglecting the reaction
of other agents, we find that available information with the new-comer should
be H ′ ' H − 2|〈A〉|+ 1. Figure 5.10 shows that the reaction of all agents is
indeed negligible, excepted near the critical point, where H is of the order of
1.
5.5 Privileged agent or insider-trading
In this section we consider a MG where a particular agent has different
characteristics. In particular we address the question of what additional
resources would be advantageous for this agent and in which circumstances.
In the first subsection, we consider an agent with S ′ strategies (with S ′ > S,
where S is the number of strategies assigned to other agents). The last two
subsections are devoted to the study of effects of asymmetric information, in
which an agent has access to privileged information which the other cannot
access. This can be achieved in several ways. First, we consider the case of a
pure population with memory M and one agent with a longer memory M ′.
Then we consider the case of an agent who knows, in advance, how a subset
of agents plays.
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5.5.1 An agent with S ′ strategies
In the symmetric phase, no matter how many strategies an agent has, there is
no possibility of gaining. Therefore we focus in this section on the asymmetric
phase.
As shown in Sect. 5.4, inductive agents over-estimate the performance of
the strategies they do not play
Let us consider now the case where an agent with S ′ strategies enters into
a MG. As shown in Sect. 5.4, to a good approximation, the value of H/P is
the only relevant information we need to retain of the stationary state of the
MG without the special agent. This quantity encodes all information such
as the number of producers, the number of strategies played by the agents
in the MG and the value of α.
We carried out numerical simulations, and compared it to the analytical
results derived in Sect. 5.4. These are shown in the figures 5.11, for H/P =
0.5, and 5.12, for H/P = 1. The virtual gain v is always larger than the
actual gain g. Even though g is less than the gain agents would get playing
only their best strategy E[gs∗] (maximal gain), it is not much smaller and
has the same leading behavior g ∝ √ln S.
Numerical simulations agree well with analytical results, apart from finite
size effects which become more pronounced if H/P is small9.
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 refer to values of H/P which are realistic of MG
with producers. A moderately large S ′ suffices to obtain a positive gain g > 0.
With S = 2 and without producers H/P ∼ 0.1 at most. For these values the
analytic approach suggests that, even playing only her best strategy an agent
would need S ′ > 750 strategies to have a positive gain, whereas inductive
agents would need more than S ′ ' 2400 strategies to obtain a positive gain.
The same agent would find that her virtual gain becomes positive with only
S ′ > 8 strategies. These results for H/P = 0.1 suffer from strong finite size
effects (which indeed are of the order of P/H). One would need system sizes
N which are well beyond what our computational resources allow to confirm
these conclusions.
It is also interesting to observe that the number of strategies actually
used by the inductive agent increases with S (sub-linearly) and it decreases
as H/P increases (see figures 5.11 and 5.12). That means that if there is
more exploitable information in the system, agent’s behavior becomes more
peaked on the best strategy.
9This is mostly due the term which we have neglected in the section 5.4 : it is typically
of the order of P/H
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Figure 5.11: Upper graph : average number of played strategies (circles)
versus S ′. Below : average virtual (diamonds) and actual (squares) gains
versus S ′ for H/P = 0.5, from top to below (averages over 500 realizations).
The lines are theoretical predictions
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Figure 5.12: Upper graph : average number of played strategies (circles)
versus S ′. Below : average virtual (diamonds) and actual (squares) gains
versus S ′ for H/P = 1, from top to below (averages over 500 realizations).
The lines are theoretical predictions.
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Figure 5.13: Upper graph : normalized available information for M and
M +1. Lower graph : Gain of an agent with M +1 within a pure population
with M = 3 (S = 2, average over 3000 realizations)
5.5.2 M ′ > M
Let us consider the case of a pure population with memory M and one agent
with a longer memory10 M ′. Figure 5.13 plots the gain of such an agent
with M ′ = M + 1 as a function of α. The average gain of all agents is also
shown for comparison. In the asymmetric phase the special agent receives a
lower payoff, which can be understood by observing that she has a number
of histories P ′ = 2M
′
= 2P bigger than that of the pure population. Thus
her effective α′ = 2α is larger, which is detrimental in the asymmetric phase.
The gain of the special agent is the same as that of normal agents at the
point where there is neither persistence, nor anti-persistence (α ' 0.25 for
M = 3, and αc in the thermodynamic limit).
By contrast, in the symmetric phase, the game is symmetric for normal
agents but their anti-persistent behavior produces arbitrages who can be
exploited by agents having a bigger memory. Indeed, as α decreases, available
information HM ′ for the privileged agent grows
11. As a result the gain of the
privileged agent becomes larger than that of other agents and as α becomes
small enough, it becomes positive.
Can the anti-persistence be exploited even more if one increases M ′ ?
The figure 5.14 answers clearly no. This is not surprising since again the
effective α is bigger and bigger as M ′ is increased. At the same time, available
10In this kind of numerical simulations, one has to keep the dynamics of histories
11HM ′ is defined as H = 〈A〉2, but with an average over µ′ = 1, . . . , 2P .
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Figure 5.14: Gain of an agent with M ′ = M +∆M within a pure population
with M = 3 (α = 0.1, average over 1000 realizations).
information increases, but too slowly.
5.5.3 Espionage
Some agents may have access to some information about other agents. This
is the case of a stock broker who knows his clients’ orders before execu-
tion, hence he has privileged information and should be barred from trading.
When there is no available information, as in the symmetric phase, an agent
who has access to asymmetric information can expect at least to lose much
less than the others agents, or even to have a positive gain. Also, since hav-
ing access to a little information is greatly preferable to no information at
all, only a very limited amount of information is needed to get a considerable
advantage. Suppose that agent b knows the sign sB of the aggregate actions
of a subset B of other agents. Let B = |B| be the number of agents in B.
Then sB(t) = sgn
∑
i∈B ai(t). She can exploit this supplementary information
by having two virtual values U+b,s(t) and U
−
b,s(t) for each of her strategies. In
other words, if agent b knows that sB(t) = +1 before having to choose, she
takes her decision according to the scores U+b,s(t), that is,
sb(t) = arg max
s=1,···,S
U+b,s(t) ; (5.11)
she updates the scores of her strategies according to
U+b,s(t + 1) = U
+
b,s(t)− aµ(t)b,s Aµ(t) (5.12)
and analogously if sB(t) = −1.
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Figure 5.15: Gain of a spy and average gain of all agents versus α (N=101,
NB = 3, 100P iterations, average over 100 realizations)
What is the kind of the supplementary information this agent has access
to ?
Since the outcome is anti-persistent in the symmetric phase and persistent
in the asymmetric phase, only at the critical point there is no long term
correlation in the outcome [24]. Accordingly, the spy always gain more than
the average, except at the critical point where she gains the same (see figure
5.15). With this setting, the agent has access in particular to the anti-
persistence of the symmetric phase, explaining why even if only one agent is
spied, the gain of the broker is much bigger (figure 5.16).
Finally, the comparison between the two types of asymmetric information
we have considered shows that it is much more interesting to spy than to have
a larger memory : in the former case, one is sure to win more that the normal
agents, except at the critical point.
5.6 From the MG to El Farol
Producers act as a symmetry breaking field on the game, that is, they induce
an a priori asymmetry on the outcome. In other words, studying producers
and speculators is equivalent to considering an asymmetric MG [46], that is,
an El Farol’s problem with binary histories and strategies. One is willing to
obtain an mean attendance around the comfort level and small fluctations.
This is equivalent to small H and sigma2/N , which can be obtained in the
MG for small α if agents account for their market impact, as shown by Fig.
5.17
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Figure 5.16: Gain of a spy versus the number of spied agents (N = 1001,
α = 0.15, average over 1000 realizations)
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
time
0
20
40
60
80
100
a
tte
nd
an
ce
Figure 5.17: Attendance versus time in the revisited El Farol’s bar problem
(N = 100, S = 2, P = 10, eta = 0.1)
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One knows in principle how to obtain exact analytical expressions of the
mean attendance and of the fluctuations around the latter. However, some
issues have still to be solved. Indeed, speculators and producers were studied
with random histories. All the discussion can be extended to real histories.
However, the bias on the histories is not of the same kind as in the original
MG : ρµ actually also depends on the number of 1 needed to encode µ, which
make the diffusion on De Bruijn graphs more difficult to study, but probably
not impossible. Finally, one should decide if an El Farol’s bar customer has
c = 0 or c = 1/2, that is, if (s)he also induces an asymmetry in the outcome
or not.
Once these issues are overcomed —an important work that has to be
done in a near future— the general binary El Farol’s bar problem will have
an exact solution, except, of course, in the symmetric phase.
5.7 Replica method for the speculators and
producers
5.7.1 Definition
There are three different population of agents :
1. the first population is composed of N speculators. These are adaptive
agents and they have each two speculative strategies aµ↑,i, a
µ
↓,i for i =
1, . . . , N and µ = 1, . . . , P . These are drawn at random from the pool
of all strategies, independently for each agent. We allow a correlation
among the two strategies of the same agent :
P (a↑, a↓) =
c
2
[
δa↑,+1δa↓,+1 + δa↑,−1δa↓,−1
]
+
1− c
2
[
δa↑,−1δa↓,+1 + δa↑,−1δa↓,+1
]
(5.13)
Note that, for c = 0 agents choose just one strategy a↑ and fix a↓ = −a↑
as its opposite, whereas for c = 1 they have one and the same strategy
a↑ = a↓. The original random case corresponds to c = 1/2. These
agents assign scores Ui,s(t) to each of their strategies and play the
strategy si(t) with the highest score, as discussed in the text. Therefore
for speculators :
aspec(t) = a
µ(t)
si(t),i
. (5.14)
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2. then we consider N indepprod = ρN producers : They have only one ran-
domly and independently drawn strategy bµi so
aprod(t) = b
µ(t)
i . (5.15)
Producers have a predictable behavior in the market and they are not
adaptive. Instead of ρN independent producers one can also consider
Ndepprod correlated producers who all have the same predictable behavior
bµprod.
It has been shown [32, 35] that the stationary state properties of the
MG are described by the ground state of H. Note that this approach fails
however to reproduce the anti-persistent behavior which is at the origin of
crowd effects in the symmetric phase. In our case
A(t) = Aspec(t) + Aprod(t) (5.16)
where
Aspec(t) =
N∑
j=1
a
µ(t)
sj(t),j
(5.17)
and
Aprod(t) =
ρN∑
j=1
b
µ(t)
j ≡ Aµ(t)prod (5.18)
Let us define, for convenience, Aµ = Aµspec + λA
µ
prod where
Aµspec =
N∑
i=1
[
aµ↑,i
1 + si
2
+ aµ↓,i
1− si
2
]
(5.19)
and Aµprod is given in Eq. (5.18). Here si is the dynamical variable controlled
by speculator i. We shall implicitly consider directly time averaged quantities
so si is a real variable in [−1, 1] rather than a discrete one. The parameter λ
is inserted so that, once we have computed the energy H = (Aspec + λAprod)2
we can compute the total gain Gprod of producers by
Gprod ≡ −AAprod = − 1
2
∂H
∂λ
∣∣∣∣∣
λ=1
.
The gain of speculators is obtained subtracting this contribution and that of
noise traders from the total gain −σ2
Gspec = −σ2 + ηN −Gprod. (5.20)
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5.7.2 Replica calculation
In this case, it suffices to find the matrix Tˆ and use the results of appendix
8.1. After having averaged the replicated partition function over the disorder,
one obtains the matrix Tˆ
Ta,b = δa,b +
2β
α
[c + ρ + (1− c)Qa,b] .
For correlated producers we would have obtained the same result but with
ρ → ρ + ρ2N2, where  measures the bias of producers towards a particular
action for a given µ, or equivalently the correlation between the actions of two
distinct producers. More precisely 2 is the average of bµi b
µ
j for i 6= j and for all
µ. Therefore the limit ρ →∞ also corresponds to a small share of producers
ρ  1 with a small bias  6= 0. Note that a bias  ∼ √N corresponds indeed
to ∼ N independent producers. Equivalently ∼ √N correlated producers,
with  finite are equivalent to ∼ N independent producers.
The free energy is given by
f(q, r) =
α
2β
log
[
1 +
2(1− c)β(Q− q)
α
]
+
α[c + ρ + (1− c)q]
α + 2(1− c)β(Q− q) +
αβ
2
(RQ− rq)
− 1
β
〈log
∫ 1
−1
dse−βVz(s)〉 (5.21)
Since ζ is fixed as a function of α by the equation
√
2
pi
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
+
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
+
α
ζ2
=
1 + ρ
1− c , (5.22)
thus ζ depends on the combination (1 + ρ)/(1 − c) which runs from 1 – for
ρ = c = 0 i.e. no producers and “perfect” speculators – to ∞. The latter
limit occurs either if c → 1, i.e. when speculators become producers, or if
ρ →∞ (many producers).
Available information is given by
Hc =
c + (1− c)Q + ρ
(1 + χ)2
(5.23)
where Q and χ take their saddle point values. The fluctations are
σ2c = Hc + (1− c)(1−Q) (5.24)
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The gain of producers, from Eq. (5.21), is
Gcprod = −
ρ
1 + χ
(5.25)
and that of speculators is obtained from Eq. (5.20),
Gcspec =
ρ
1 + χ
− c + (1− c)Q + ρ
(1 + χ)2
− (1− c)(1−Q) (5.26)
Chapter 6
Toward a realistic model of
markets
The previous chapter showed how some very simple extensions to the stan-
dard MG allow to study market impact and the role of information in finan-
cial markets. In order to be more realistic, the MG needs to be modified
without compromising its simplicity. In particular, exactly solvable exten-
sions will be privileged.
The main issue is about the heterogeneity of agents. Indeed, if the basic
MG captures heterogeneity in behaviors and beliefs, it does not include the
effect of richness and poverty, that is, in the MG, all agents have the same
weight. In this chapter, the MG is generalized to weighted agents, first with
fixed weight, and then to dynamical weights (agents invest a fixed fraction of
their variable capital). Finally, one considers another kind of heterogeneity
in markets are the sensibility of agents to price changes, which explains why
all the agents are not interested in playing in market at every time step.
6.1 Fixed weights
This modification can be easily handled : each agent has a fixed weight wi in
the market, meaning that he plays ±wi at each time step, where the weights
are drawn from a given pdf.
Numerical simulations reveal that the structure of the resulting MG is
exactly the same. In addition, the replica calculus can be adapted. Using
the general replica calculus for stationary MG found in appendix 8.1, with
f0 = ρ〈v2〉+ 〈w2〉c and f1 = 〈w2〉(1− c), one obtains
Hc =
〈w2〉(1 + Q)
2(1 + χ)2
(6.1)
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and
σ2c
N
= Hc +
〈w2〉w(1−Q)
2
(6.2)
where Q and χ, as usual, take their saddle point value, which are slightly
modified:
〈w2〉wQ = 〈w2〉w − 〈(w2 − 1/ζ2) erf
(
ζw√
2
)
〉w −
√
2
pi
1
ζ
〈we−ζ2w2/2〉w (6.3)
The equation of χ is now
χ =
[
α/〈erf
(
ζw√
2
)
〉w − 1
]−1
(6.4)
Finally ζ is fixed as a function of α by the equation
α
ζ2
− 〈w2〉Q = 2〈w2〉w, (6.5)
that is,
Eq. (6.4) means that χ diverges when α → αc(ρ, c)+, which then implies
that at the critical point
〈erf
(
ζcw√
2
)
〉 = αc. (6.6)
These predictions hold as long as 〈w2〉 is defined, that is, as long as the
pdf has a finite variance : they are fully confirmed by Fig 6.2, where a Poisson
distribution was used.
Another issue concerns the critical point location. How does it depend
on the parameters of the distribution and of the distribution is a question
difficult to answer analytically. However, Fig 6.1 reports the theoretical
predictions for the pdf P (w) = γwγ−1 exp(−wγ) and power laws pdf Pγ(w) =
γ/(1+w)γ+1. The pdfs’s average and variance are respectively Γ(1/γ)/γ2 and
Γ(1+2γ)/γ, and 1/[(γ−1)(γ−2)] and 1/[(γ−1)(γ−2)(γ−3)]. Interestingly,
if the first moment is not defined, the MG is always in the asymmetric phase
(αc = 0), because the outcome A is dominated by the contribution of one
agent. This happens for γ = 0+ for the first pdf, and γ ≤ 2 for the second
pdf.
Note that for infinite variance, the replica calculus still can be done, but
the control parameter is no more α = P/N [55]
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Figure 6.1: Normalized fluctuations versus α for Poisson wealth and various
parameters (P = 100, S = 2, 300P iterations, average over 100 samples).
The continuous lines are the corresponding theoretical predictions
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Figure 6.2: Location of the critical point versus the parameter γ of the
weights’ pdf for Pγ(w) = γw
γ−1 exp(−wγ) (dashed line) and Pγ(w) = γ/wγ+1
(continuous line)
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available information (squares) and average capital of agents (diamonds)
(P = 100, S = 2,  = 0.1, 1500P iterations, average over 50 samples).
6.2 Evolving weights
In real markets, agents’ capital is a dynamical quantity. The market and
the decisions of agents decide of the evolution of their capital. Agents that
become poorer and poorer cannot sustain constant investments, and richer
agents can be tempted to invest more, since they are being successful. Agents
here invest a constant fraction  of their capital [55]. Since the MG is a
negative sum game without producers, one adds some of the latter in order
to make the game more attractive for the agents. Interestingly, one can show
that, again, the information is minimized by agents — a definitively universal
feature of minority games —, and in the stationary state, the average gain of
agents is zero, which is curiously the centennial assertion of Bachelier, and
raises the question of how to interpret this finding. Fig 6.3 shows that there
is also a phase transition. In this case, the average wealth is maximal at
the critical point, whereas in the basic MG, the average gain is maximal at
this point. Note that the fraction of frozen agents is always very high, and
increase as the number of agents increase. This is similar to agents taking
into account their impact on the game ; indeed, the fact that their capital
reflects their own success, is a way of accountint for market impact.
The replica calculus, again, can be generalized and gives exact results,
but is several folds more complicated. It is under investigation.
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6.3 Heterogeneity in price tracking
Apart from the fixed weight hypothesis, the most unrealistic assumption is
that agents have to play at each time step, implying that the volume is
constant. This is not the case in financial markets.
In order to extend the MG, one has to answer the following question :
why do agents not change their positions all at the same time ? For instance,
market makers are forced to play every time step, day traders change their
positions dozens of times per day. At the other end of scale, small investors
update their positions few times a year. One explanation for this is their
heterogeneity of goals and motivations [44, 45]. For a day trader, a small
price change is enough for closing his position and taking his profits. A small
investor does not react for so few, he waits (at least) for a change of several
percents. Note that a heterogeneity in thresholds implies a heterogeneity if
time scales.
The MG is modified as follows : each agent i has his own price change
horizon ri (market makers have ri = 0). The ri are drawn from a given pdf.
At times ti(k), agent i receives a signal, meanining that the price change
ratio exceeds ri since the last time he updated his position, that is,
ri >
∣∣∣∣∣ p[ti(k)]p[ti(k − 1)] − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (6.7)
His personal history µi encodes the last M threshold signs and is also updated
at time ti(k). The strategies’ score are changed according to
Ui,s(ti(k + 1)) = Ui,s − [p[ti(k)]− p[ti(k − 1)]]/p[ti(k)− 1] (6.8)
so that the game is a minority game in the short run and a majority game
in the long run. At each time step,
N(t) =
∑
i
Θ
(
ri −
∣∣∣∣∣ p[ti(k)]p[ti(k − 1)] − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
)
(6.9)
agents are active and wish to change their position. They use their best
strategy, as before, and put the order a
µi(t)
i,si(t)
, so that the excess demand/offer
is
A(t) =
∑
i : active agent
a
µi(t)
i,si(t)
(6.10)
There is no consensus on the price formation equation given A(t) [63, 4, 9, 64].
In first approximation, one can write
x(t + 1) = x(t) +
A(t)
λ
(6.11)
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Figure 6.4: Temporal evolution of the price (M = 8, N = 5001, S = 2)
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Figure 6.5: Histogram of returns of Fig. 6.4
where x(t) = log p(t) and λ is the liquidity, or the depth of the market.
The resulting price is plotted in Fig. 6.4, where P (r) = γ/(1+r)γ+1. The
histogram of x(t) is found in Fig. 6.5. It shows that the price is strongly non
Gaussian for small x, and has exponential tails. This model clearly show
the way to create more realistic MG based models. It also begs for a more
detailed study.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
By combining both simplicity and rich behavior, the Minority Game is be-
coming a paradigm of competition between adaptative agents. It also illus-
trates in a very simple way how physicists can use their tools for understand-
ing problems outside their traditional area of expertise. It took more than
one year for the Econophysics community to begin to understand it. Now the
standard MG is reasonably understood, and one knows how to obtain exact
analytical expressions for the whole range of parameters where the system
reaches a stationary state, while the analytical description of the symmetric
phase still remains a challenge.
Apart from completing the understanding of the standard MG, there are
some very interesting extensions to be worked on :
• Obtaining the Lyapunov function for all kinds of reasonable payoffs. It
is clear that the structure of the game is the same for all these payoffs,
but that stationary state is not the same.
• Revisiting the El Farol’s bar problem. Indeed, with correct induc-
tive dynamics (η), even agents with binary strategies are able to self-
organize around the comfort level with very small fluctuations, which
is considered as impossible by some economists.
• Studying thoroughly more realistic models of financial markets. They
should include variable number of agents, evolving capital and minority-
majority mechanisms. Initially, one should study and understand all of
them separatly, and afterwards combine them in order to obtain a real-
istic model of market with as few parameters as possible, and hopefully
exactly solvable.
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Outlook
The MG is relevant not only for the understanding of the El Farol’s bar prob-
lem. It is fundamental since the minority mechanism is found ubiquitously
in nature. It shows for instance that we are interacting and can cooperate
with other people in numerous ways without being aware of it. Even more,
selfishness is not an obstacle to cooperation, provided that all people have
access to the same information. If someones have more relevant information
than others, they can outperform the latter. Initially the El Farol’s bar prob-
lem was thought as a provocation by Arthur, it shed eventually some light
on real life situations and gave some very unexpected conclusions.
Even if the interest in the Minority Game has been more or less confined
to the phycists’ community, encouraging sign are coming from economists
and biolgists.
Indeed, some economists are now working on MG-like models. They
realize that even their own MG versions share the same characteristics as the
MG. This suggests that the findings contained in this thesis are in some way
“universal”.
Biologists in turn use the Minority Game in order to understand why some
birds species migrate in huge groups instead of very small ones, whereas they
are more likely to be short on resources.
There are probably numerous other situations hiding an underlying mi-
nority mechanism. The challenge for physicists, economists, biologists and
sociologists is now to find them.
Chapter 8
Appendix
8.1 General procedure of replica calculus for
the MG :
In general, we obtain
〈Zn(β)〉 = e−NnβF (Qˆ,rˆ)
with
F (Qˆ, rˆ) =
α
2nβ
Tr log Tˆ +
αβ
2n
∑
a,b
ra,bQa,b − 1
nβ
log
[
Trse
αβ2
2
∑
a,b
ra,bsasb
]
where
Ta,b = δa,b +
2β
α
f(Qa,b). (8.1)
and f(x) = f0 + f1x. With the replica symmetric ansatz
Qa,b = q + (Q− q)δa,b, ra,b = r + (R− r)δa,b
the matrix Tˆ is such that
Ta,a = 1 +
2β
α
f(Q) (8.2)
and
Ta,b =
2β
α
f(q) for a 6= b (8.3)
Therefore, Tˆ has n− 1 degenerated eigenvalues λ0 = 1 + f1(Q− q) and one
eigenvalue equal to λ1 = (n− 1)f(q)+1+ f(Q) = nf(q)+λ0 therefore, after
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standard algebra,
F (RS)(q, r) =
α
2β
log
(
1 +
2β
α
f1(Q− q)
)
+
f(q)
1 + 2β
α
f1(Q− q)
+
αβ
2
(RQ− rq)− 1
β
〈log
∫ 1
−1
dse−βVz(s)〉 (8.4)
where we found it convenient to define the “potential”
Vz(s) = −αβ(R− r)
2
s2 −√αr z s (8.5)
so that the last term of F (RS) looks like the free energy of a particle in the
interval [−1, 1] with potential Vz(s) where z plays the role of disorder.
The saddle point equations are given by :
∂F (RS)
∂q
= 0 ⇒ r = 4f(q)f1
α2(1 + χ)2
(8.6)
∂F (RS)
∂Q
= 0 ⇒ β(R− r) = − 2f1
α(1 + χ)
(8.7)
∂F (RS)
∂R
= 0 ⇒ Q = 〈〈s2〉〉 (8.8)
∂F (RS)
∂r
= 0 ⇒ β(Q− q) = 〈〈sz〉〉√
αr
(8.9)
where 〈〈·〉〉 stands for a thermal average over the above mentioned one par-
ticle system and χ = 2βf1(Q−q)
α
In the limit β → 0 we can look for a solution with q → Q and r → R. It
is convenient to define
ζ = −
√
α
r
β(R− r) (8.10)
and to require that χ and ζ stay finite in the limit β →∞. The averages are
easily evaluated since, in this case, they are dominated by the minimum of
the potential Vz(s) =
√
αr(ys2/2 − zs) for s ∈ [−1, 1]. The minimum is at
s = −1 for z ≤ −ζ and at s = +1 for z ≥ ζ. For −ζ < z < ζ the minimum
is at s = z/ζ. With this we find
〈〈sz〉〉 = 1
ζ
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
(8.11)
and
〈〈s2〉〉 = Q = 1−
√
2
pi
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
−
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
(8.12)
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With some more algebra, one easily finds :
x =
[
α/erf
(
ζ√
2
)
− 1
]−1
(8.13)
Finally ζ is fixed as a function of α by the equation
1−Q + α
ζ2
=
f0 + f1
f1
, (8.14)
that is, √
2
pi
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
+
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
+
α
ζ2
=
f0 + f1
f1
. (8.15)
Eq. (8.13) means that χ diverges when α → αc(ρ, c)+, which then implies
that at the critical point
erf
(
ζc√
2
)
= αc. (8.16)
This back in the other saddle point equations, yields the following equation
for ζ = ζc : √
2
pi
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
+ erf
(
ζ√
2
)
=
f0 + f1
f1
. (8.17)
The free energy, at the saddle point, for β →∞, is
H
N
=
2f(Q)
(1 + χ)2
(8.18)
where Q and x take their saddle point values Eqs. (8.12) and (8.13).
8.2 Replica calculus for any S
Our goal is to compute and characterize the minimum of Hη = 〈A〉2− ηNG,
with G given by Eq. (2.32), in ∆N = {~pii, i = 1, · · · , N}. Considering Hη as
an Hamiltonian of a statistical mechanic’s system, this can be done analyzing
the zero temperature limit. First we build the partition function
Z(β) = Trpie
−βHη{pi}, (8.19)
where β is the inverse temperature and Trpi stands for an integral on ∆
N (we
call simply pi an element of ∆N ). The quantity of interest is then
min
pi∈∆N
Hη{pi} = − lim
β→∞
β−1 ln Z(β). (8.20)
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This in principle depends on the specific realization aµi,s of rules chosen by
agents. In practice however, to leading order in N , all realizations of aµi,s yield
the same limit, which then coincides with the average of minpi∈∆N Hη{pi} over
aµi,s. The average of ln Z over the a’s, which we denote by 〈. . .〉a, is reduced
to that of moments of Z using the replica trick[52]:
〈ln Z〉a = lim
n→0
1
n
ln〈Zn〉a (8.21)
With integer n the calculation of 〈Zn〉a amounts to study n replicas of the
same system with the same realization of aµi,s. To do this we introduce a
set of dynamical variables pia ≡ {pii,s,a} for each replica, which are labeled
by the additional index a = 1, . . . , n. Each replica has its corresponding
Hamiltonian, which we write as Haη{pia} = A2a−ηNGa,a where Aµa =
∑
i ~pii,a·~ai
and NGa,a =
∑
i |pii,a|2 (the reason for this notation shall become clear later).
The set of all dynamical variables for all replicas is the direct product ∆N
n
of n phase spaces ∆N . In order to compute the limit n → 0 in Eq. (8.21)
one appeals to analytic continuation of 〈Zn〉a for real n. We give here the
details of the calculation in our specific case. More details on the nature of
the method can be found in ref. [52]. We write
〈Zn〉 = Trpi
n∏
a=1
∏
µ
〈e−β%µ[(Aµa)2−ηNGa,a]〉a
= Trpi
∏
µ
n∏
a=1
Ezµa 〈e−i
√
2β%µzµa A
µ
a〉aeβηNGa,a (8.22)
where Ez[. . .] stands for the expectation over the Gaussian variable (unit
variance and zero mean) z and we have introduced one such variable zµa for
each a and µ, using the identity Ez[e
−ixz] = e−x
2/2. In addition we used the
shorthand Trpi for the integral over ∆
Nn. The average over aµi,s now factorizes
n∏
a=1
〈e−i
√
2β%µzµa A
µ
a〉a =
∏
i
S∏
s=1
〈e−i
√
2β%µ(
∑
a
zµa pi
a
i,s)a
µ
i,s〉a
=
∏
i
S∏
s=1
cos
[√
2β%µ
n∑
a=1
zµa pi
a
i,s
]
' ∏
i
exp

−β%µ n∑
a,b=1
zµa z
µ
b
∑
i
~piai · ~pibi

 . (8.23)
In the last passage we used the relation cos x ' e−x2/2 which is correct to
order x2 in a power expansion. This is justified as long as %µ → 0 as P =
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αN →∞ for each µ = 1, · · · , P . Note that, for this reason, we would have got
the same result for any generic distribution Pi(a) of a
µ
i,s such that 〈a〉 = 0 and
〈a2〉 = 1. This allows us to understand why models with continuum strategies
aµi,s ∈ IR, such as the one proposed in ref. [29], yield the same results as the
one with binary strategies, which we are discussing here. Before going back
to Eq. (8.22), we introduce the matrices Gˆ ≡ {Ga,b, a, b = 1, . . . , n} and
rˆ ≡ {ra,b, a, b = 1, . . . , n} through the identities
1 =
∫
dGa,bδ
(
Ga,b − 1
N
∑
i
~piai · ~pibi
)
∝
∫
dra,bdGa,be
αβ2ra,b
2 (
∑
i
~piai ·~pibi−NGa,b)
for all a ≥ b, where δ(x) is Dirac’s delta function and we used its integral rep-
resentation. The only part depending on the piai,s in 〈Zn〉 is eαβ
2
∑
a≥b
ra,b
∑
i
~piai ·~pibi /2.
This can be factorized in the agent’s index i and so the integral Trpi on ∆
N n
can be factorized into N integrals over ∆n (=the direct product of the sim-
plexes of the n replicas of the same agent’s mixed strategies). With this we
can write
〈Zn〉 =
∫
dra,bdGa,be
−βnNFβ(Gˆ,rˆ) (8.24)
where, specializing to the case %µ = 1/P 1,
Fβ(Gˆ, rˆ) =
α
2nβ
ln det
[
Iˆ +
2β
α
Gˆ
]
+
αβ
2n
∑
a,b
ra,bGa,b
− 1
nβ
ln Trpi∈∆n exp

αβ2
2
∑
a,b
ra,b~pi
a~pib

− η∑
a
Ga,a, (8.25)
where Iˆ is the identity matrix. The first term arises from the expectation over
zµa . This factorizes for each µ and one is left with a Gaussian integral over ~z ∈
IRn. The second and the third terms arise from the integral representation
of the delta functions2.
The key point is that, in the limit N →∞ the integral over the matrices
rˆ and Gˆ in Eq. (8.24) are dominated by their saddle point value, i.e. by the
values of ra,b and Ga,b for which F attains its minimum value
3. One should
then study the first order conditions ∂F/∂ra,b = 0 and ∂F/∂Ga,b = 0 for all
a, b. Here we focus on the replica symmetric approximation where we assume
that the matrices for which F attains its extreme have the form
Ga,b = g + (G− g)δa,b, ra,b = r + (R− r)δa,b. (8.26)
1A generic distribution %µ can also be handled, though with heavier notations.
2For simplicity we have also done the transformation ra,b → ra,b/2 for a 6= b so that∑
a≥b →
∑
a,b.
3Note that, by Eq. (8.20), we shall also be interested in the limit of β →∞ at the end!
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This ansatz is correct for η ≤ 0 and for η > 0 and α large enough[61]. The
reason for this is that Hη is a non-negative definite quadratic form in ∆
N .
Hence it has a very simple energy landscape, characterized by a single valley.
Taking the limit n → 0, Eq. (8.21) then gives
F
(RS)
β (Q, q, R, r) =
αg
α + 2β(G− g) +
α
2β
ln
[
1 +
2β(G− g)
α
]
− ηG
+
αβ
2
(RG− rg)− 1
β
E~z{ln Trpi exp [−βV~z(~pi)]} (8.27)
where Trpi is now the integral over the simplex ∆ of a single agent’s mixed
strategies and we defined, for convenience, the potential V~z(~pi) =
√
αr ~z ·~pi−
α
2
β(R− r)|pi|2. The parameters g, G, r and R are fixed by the first order con-
ditions ∂F
(RS)
β /∂g = 0, ∂F
(RS)
β /∂G = 0, ∂F
(RS)
β /∂r = 0 and ∂F
(RS)
β /∂R = 0.
These equations, finally, have to be studied in the limit β → ∞, where one
recovers the minimum of Hη by Eq. (8.20), i.e.
lim
N→∞
min
pi∈∆N
Hη{pi}
N
= − lim
β→∞
1
βN
〈ln Z(β)〉 = lim
β→∞
F
(RS)
β (Q, q, R, r)
∣∣∣∣
sp
where the subscript sp means that we compute the function F
(RS)
β at the
saddle point values of Q, q, R and r.
It is convenient to define the parameters
χ =
2β(G− g)
α
, y =
√
g/α
1 + η(1 + χ)
(8.28)
In the limit β → ∞, we first look for solutions where g → G and χ, which
we call susceptibility, remains finite. This implies that two replicas of the
same system converge in the long run to the same stationary state. Using
the saddle point equations, and g = G, we can rewrite
V~z(~pi) =
2y ~z · ~pi + pi2
1 + χ
, β →∞ (8.29)
The last term in Eq. (8.27) is dominated by the mixed strategy ~pi∗(~z) which
is the solution of
~pi∗(~z) = arg min
pi∈∆
V~z(~pi). (8.30)
We find that G = g = E~z[~pi
∗(~z)], which is then a function of y only G ≡ G(y).
Upon defining ζ(y) = E~z[~z · ~pi∗(~z)], we find
χ(y) = − ζ(y)√
αG(y) + ζ(y)
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The second of Eqs. (8.28) becomes an equation for y as a function of α which
has two implicit solutions. These can be expressed as explicit solutions for
α as a function of y and η:
α =
1
G

G− yζ ±
√
(G + yζ)2 − 4ηyζG
2(1− η)y


2
(8.31)
8.2.1 η ≤ 0
The solutions of Eq. (8.31), for η < 0 describe the two branches α < αc and
α > αc. In particular for η → 0− these solutions become
αy2 = G(y), αG(y) = ζ2(y). (8.32)
Let us discuss first the case η → 0−: The free energy per agent is
lim
N→∞
H
N
= − lim
N→∞
〈lnZ(β)〉a
N
=
G
(1 + χ)2
(8.33)
These equations are transcendental and we could not find an explicit
solution for generic S. Nevertheless, they represent a great simplification
with respect to the original problem. The main technical difficulty lies in
the evaluation of the functions G(y) = E~z[|pi∗(~z)|2] and ζ(y) = E~z[~z · ~pi∗(~z)],
which can be computed numerically to any desired accuracy ∀S.
The first of Eqs. (8.32) gives the α > αc phase. This solution has χ > 0
finite and H > 0 non-zero. As α decreases χ increases and it diverges as
|α−αc|−1 when α → α+c . In this limit Eq. (8.33) implies that H ∼ |α−αc|2
vanishes. The critical point αc = α(yc) is obtained imposing χ = ∞, which
gives G(yc) = −ycζ(yc). By the numerical evaluation of the functions G(y)
and ζ(y), we find
αc(S) ∼= αc(2) + S − 2
2
(8.34)
to a high degree of accuracy. It might be that this equation is exact but
we could not prove it. An interesting relation for αc(S) can be derived by
algebraic considerations: Note that for each pii,s > 0 the equation
∂H
∂pii,s
= 2
∑
j,s′
ai,sas′,jpis′,j = 0 (8.35)
must hold. This is a set of linear equations in the variables pii,s > 0. The
NS×NS matrix ai,saj,s′ is built with P dimensional vectors aµi,s and therefore
has at most rank P . In other words there are only P independent equations
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(8.35). In addition there are N normalization conditions on pii,s. The sys-
tem becomes dynamically degenerate when the number of free variables pii,s
becomes bigger than the number P + N of independent equations and, ex-
actly at αc the two are equal. Dividing this condition by N gives the desired
equation
S∑
s=1
E~z{θ[pi∗s(~z)]} = αc(S) + 1. (8.36)
The left hand side is the average number of strategies used by agents, n.
Note that this equation implies that αc(S) cannot grow faster than linear in
S. Also αc(S) ∝ S/2 imply that agents use on average 1/2 of their strategies
at αc.
The second of Eqs. (8.32) gives the α < αc phase. Note indeed that with
this choice χ ' −1/η → ∞ and H ∼ η2 → 0 as η → 0−. At odds with
the solution for α > αc, this equation only arises if η < 0 and in the limit
η → 0−. With η = 0 the saddle point equations have only a solution with
G > g in the limit β → ∞. This is because for α < αc the set M where
H = 0 is not a single point, but rather a connected set. The replica method
with η = 0 takes an average on all the set M and so it gives results which are
not representative of a particular system4. In order to select a single point
in M one may consider the limit η → 0−. Since the term −η N G in Hη
breaks the degeneracy of equilibria for η = 0, the limit η → 0− selects the
equilibrium which is closest to the random initial condition pii,s(0) = 1/S for
all i = 1, · · · , N and s = 1, . . . , S. This describes the stationary state of a
system of agents with no prior beliefs (Ui,s(t = 0) = 0, ∀i, s).
In both phases, once the saddle point equations are solved, one can derive
the full statistical characterization of the system. For instance the fraction
of agents playing a strategies in a neighborhood d~pi of ~pi is given by p(~pi)d~pi =
E~z[δ(~pi
∗(~z)− ~pi)]d~pi.
8.2.2 η > 0
Let us for simplicity consider the simpler case S = 2. The solution with G = g
exists for α ≥ 1/pi. For α > [pi(1− η)2]−1 this solution has G = g < 1, which
means that agents do not all play pure strategies. When α → [pi(1− η)2]−1,
G → 1 and the solution becomes independent of η. In other words, the
solution merges with the solution for η = 1. This solution breaks down
too, with χ → ∞ and H1/N = σ2/N → 0 when α → 1/pi. Below this
point, only solutions with G < g and H1/N = 0 exist. This behavior is
4Note indeed that g has the interpretation of the overlap between two replicas of the
same system, so that g < G means that the two replicas are not identical.
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well documented in figure 4.4. However, for η > 0, one needs to go beyond
the simple approximation for Ga,b and ra,b in Eq. (8.26). Therefore we shall
refrain from a more detailed discussion and rather refer the interested reader
to a forthcoming publication [61].
126 CHAPTER 8. APPENDIX
Bibliography
[1] A. Dragulescu, V. M. Yakovenkom, preprint cond-mat/0001432 ; A.
Chakraborti, B. K. Chakrabarti, preprint cond-mat/0004256
[2] V. Plerou, P. Gopikrishnan, L. A. N. Amaral, X. Gabaix, H. E. Stanley
preprint cond-mat/9912051
[3] W. B. Arthur, J. H. Holland, B. LeBaron, R. Palmer, P. Taylor, Physica
D (1996)
[4] J.-P. Bouchaud, R. Cont, preprint cond-mat/9801279
[5] See the Minority Game’s web page on
http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics
[6] L. Bachelier, “The´orie de la spe´culation” Paris (1900), reprinted in P.
Cootner, “Random Character of Stock Prices”, MIT Press, Cambridge
(1964)
[7] D. Fama, J. of Finance, 25,383 (1965) Am.
Econ. Assoc. Papers and Proc 84, 406, 1994.
(http ://www.santafe.edu/arthur/Papers/El Farol.html)
[8] http://www.proinvest.com/home/emh.htm
[9] Y.-C. Zhang, Physica A 269, 30 (1999). (cond-mat/9901243)
[10] M. Marsili, S. Maslov and Y.-C. Zhang, preprint cond-mat/9801239
[11] S. Maslov and Yi-Cheng Zhang, Int. J. of Th. and Applied Fin, preprint
cond-mat/9801240 (1999)
[12] W. Brock, J. Lakonishok and B. LeBaron, J. of Finance (Dec. 1992)
[13] H. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge (1997)
[14] Arthur W. B.,
127
128 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[15] T. R. Kaplan, preprint (1998).
[16] A. Greenwald, preprints available at
http ://cs.nyu.edu/phd students/amygreen (1997).
[17] J. W. Weibull, “Evolutionary Game Theory”, MIT Press, Cambridge
(1995)
[18] J. L. Casti, Complexity, 5 1, 7 (1996)
[19] D. B. Fogel, K. Chellapilla and P. J. Angeline, IEEE Trans. Ev. Comp.
Vol. 3 no 2 (1999).
[20] Challet D. and Zhang Y.-C., Physica A 246, 407 (1997) (adap-
org/9708006).
[21] Savit R., Manuca R., and Riolo R., PRL, 82(10), 2203 (1999), preprint
adap-org/9712006.
[22] Challet D. and Zhang Y.-C., Physica A 256, 514 (1998) (cond-
mat/9805084) ;
[23] Y.-C. Zhang, Europhys. News 29, 51 (1998) (cond-mat/9803308)
[24] D. Challet and M. Marsili, Phys. Rev. E 60, 6271 (1999), preprint cond-
mat/9904071
[25] R. Mansilla, preprints cond-mat/9906017 and cond-mat/0002331
[26] R. D’hulst, G. J. Rodgers, preprint cont-mat/9902001 (1999)
[27] N. F. Johnson, M. Hart, P. M. Hui, preprints cond-mat/9811227 and
cond-mat/0003486
[28] N. Brunel and R. Zecchina, PRE 49 3, R1823 (1994)
[29] A. Cavagna, J.P. Garrahan, I. Giardina, D. Sherrington, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 83, 4429 (1999) preprint cond-mat/9903415 (1999).
[30] D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine, The theory of learning in games (MIT
Press, 1998).
[31] Luce R.D., Individual Choice Behavior : A Theoretical Analysis, New
York, Wiley (1959).
[32] D. Challet, M. Marsili and R. Zecchina, Phys. Rev. Lett 84, 1824 (2000),
preprint cond-mat/9904392
BIBLIOGRAPHY 129
[33] D. Challet, M. Marsili and R. Zecchina, Comment on “A thermal model
for adaptative competition”, submitted to Phys. Rev. Lett. (2000)
[34] Challet D., M. Marsili and Y.-C. Zhang, Physica A 276, 284 (2000)
preprint cond-mat/9909265
[35] M. Marsili, D. Challet and R. Zecchina, to appear in Physica A (2000),
preprint cond-mat/9908480
[36] M. Marsili and D. Challet, submitted to Adv. Compl. Sys., preprint
cond-mat/0004376
[37] A. M. Sengupta, Mitra P. P. , Phys. Rev. E 60, 3389 (1999).
[38] A. Cavagna, Phys. Rev. E, 59, R3783, preprint cond-mat/9812215,
(1998) .
[39] D. Challet and M. Marsili, submitted to Phys. Rev. E, preprint cond-
mat/0004196 (2000)
[40] See the web page http://www.scs.carleton.ca/∼quesnel/papers/debruijn/paper.html
for a nice introduction to De Bruijn graphs.
[41] S. Berg, M. Marsili, A. Rustichini, R. Zecchina et al. forthcoming.
[42] A. Rustichini, preprint (1999)
[43] M. A. R. de Cara et al. preprint cond-mat/9811162 (1998)
[44] R. B. Olsen, M. M. Dacorogna, U. A. Mller, O. V. Pictet, Olsen internal
document RBO.1992-09-07 (1992) (available on www.olsen.ch)
[45] U. A. Mller, M. M. Dacorogna, R. D. Dav, O. V. Pictet, R. B. Olsen and
J.R. Ward, Olsen internal document UAM.1993-08-16 (1993) (available
on www.olsen.ch)
[46] N. F. Johnson et al., preprint cond-mat/9905039 (1999)
[47] Y. Li, A. VanDeemen, R. Savit, preprint nlin/0002004
[48] A. De Cara, P. Guinea, preprint cond-mat/9904187
[49] M. Paczuski, K. E. Bassler and A. Corral, cond-mat/9905082 (1999)
[50] T. Kalinowski, H.-J. Schulz and M. Briese, Physica A 277 (3-4), 502-508
(2000)
130 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[51] P. De Los Rios, S. Moelbert unpublished ; M. A. R. de Cara, P. Guinea,
unpublished.
[52] M. Mezard, G. Parisi, M. A. Virasoro, Spin glass theory and beyond
(World Scientific, 1987).
[53] V. Dotsenko, An introduction to the theory of spin glasses and neural
networks ; World Scientific Publishing (1995).
[54] M. Marsili and R. Zecchina, unpublished
[55] D. Challet, A. Chessa and M. Marsili, unpublished.
[56] P. Bak et al. PNAS 92, 5202 (1995)
[57] Y. Li et al., Physica A 276, preprints cond-mat/9903415 and cond-
mat/9906001
[58] N. F. Johnson, M. Hart, P. M. Hui and D. Zheng, cond-mat/9910072
[59] J. B. Delong, A. Schleifer, L. H. Summers, R. J. Waldmann, Noise
Trader Risk in Financial Markets, J. Political Econ. 98 (1990)703.
[60] F. Ricci-Tersenghi et al., unpublished
[61] A. De Martino, M. Marsili, R. Zecchina, forthcoming
[62] J. D. Farmer, Comp. Fin., Nov-Dec (1999), pp. 26-39
[63] J. D. Farmer, Santa Fe working paper 98-12-117
[64] T. S. Lo, P. M. Hui, N. F. Johnson, preprint cond-mat/0003379
